

Cum (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiabatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam.

In these words we ~~have~~^{get} - it seems to me - a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of ~~the~~ language ~~designate~~^{name} objects - sentences are combinations of such ~~designations~~^{names}.

In this picture of ~~language~~^{human} we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.

Augustine ~~does~~^{however} not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. ~~Whoever~~^{anyone who} describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will ~~come~~^{come} out all right, eventually.

2. Consider ~~this~~^{new} application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which ~~are~~^{I have written the signs} the marks: "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the ~~box~~^{draw} that has the ~~mark~~^{sign} "apples" on it; then he looks up the word "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now ~~speaks~~^{draws out loud} the series of cardinal ~~numbers~~^{numbers} - I assume ~~that~~ he knows them by heart - up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an apple ~~from the box~~^{from the draw} that has the colour of the square. - ~~This is~~^{in this way} in similar ~~ways~~^{ways} we operate with words. - "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the word 'five'?" - Well, I am assuming that he ~~acts~~^{acts}, as I have described. ~~The~~ Explanations come to an end somewhere. ~~But~~^{But} what is the meaning of the word "five"? - There was no question of ~~it~~^{such an entity 'meaning'} here; only of the way in which "five" is used. ~~Nothing of that sort was being discussed; only the way in which "five" is used.~~

3. That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive ~~action~~^{action} of the way in which ~~language~~^{our} functions. But ~~one~~^{we} might also say, it is ~~the~~^{a picture} ~~notion~~ of a more primitive language than ours.

4. Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language ~~shall help~~^{is to be the mean} ~~a~~^{and his} ~~builder~~ A ~~to make himself understood by an~~ assistant B.

In these words we are given, it seems to me,

assistant B. A is constructing a building out of building ~~stones~~^{blocks}; there ~~is a supply of~~^{are} cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the buildingstones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A ~~shouts~~^{calls} out the words; - B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.

~~Regard~~^{Regard} this as a complete primitive language.

5 Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; ~~only~~^{however} not everything that we call language is this system.

(And this ~~is~~^{one must} say in ~~some~~^{some} so many cases when the question arises: "~~is~~^{is} this description ~~to be used or can't it be used?~~^{an appropriate or not?}". The answer is, "Yes, it ~~can be used~~^{is appropriate}; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you ~~were~~^{are} profess~~ed~~^{ed} to describe." Think of the theories of ~~the~~ economists.)

6 It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules. . .", and we ~~were to answer~~^{seem to be} him: You ~~are apparently~~ thinking of games played on a board; but these aren't all ~~games~~ the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

7 Imagine a ~~way of writing~~^{type script} in which ~~letters are used to stand for~~ ~~indicate~~ sounds, but ~~also to indicate emphasis~~^{are used as accents} and as ~~marks of~~ punctuation. (One can regard a ~~way of writing~~^{type script} as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone ~~understood this way of~~^{interpreted our} ~~writing~~^{type} as though it were one in which ~~every~~^{all} letters ~~there~~^{here} simply ~~corresponded~~^{just stood for} a sound, and as though the letters ~~did not have other~~^{also have} quite ~~very~~ different functions ~~as well~~. - ~~Such~~^{Such} an oversimplified view of ~~the~~^{our} ~~type~~^{script} like this one resembles, I believe, ~~to~~ Augustine's view of language.

8 If ~~one considers~~^{we look at our} example (2) ~~we~~^{we} may perhaps ~~begin to suspect~~^{get an idea of} how ~~the~~^{general} ~~commonly accepted~~ concept of the meaning of ~~words~~^a surrounds the ~~functioning~~^{working} of language with a mist that makes ~~clear~~

~~clear vision~~ ^{it} impossible. ~~It scatters the fog~~ ^{no one clearly} ~~if we study the~~ ^{The} ~~workings~~ ^{is dispersed} ~~phenomena~~ of language in primitive ~~cases~~ ^{its} of application, ~~where~~ ^{in which it is easy} ~~the simplicity enables one~~ to get a clear view of the ~~words~~ ^{purpose of the} ~~function~~ and of ~~what their purpose is.~~ ^{the way they function.}

Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

9.

We ~~might~~ ^{could} imagine that the language (4) is the entire language of A and B; even the entire language of a tribe. The children are brought up to carry out ~~just the~~ ^{in question} activities, to use ~~just these~~ ^{such & such} words and to react in ~~just this~~ ^{such & such a} way to the words of ~~others.~~

An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the ~~attention of the~~ child's attention to them and at ~~the same time~~ pronouncing a word; for instance, the word "slab" in pointing to this block. (I do ~~not~~ want to call this "ostensive explanation" or "definition", because the child can't ^{as} yet ask what the thing is called. I will call it "ostensive teaching of words". - I say ~~that~~ will constitute an important part of the training, because ~~this~~ is ~~so~~ ^{with} ~~easy~~ among human beings, not because ~~we~~ couldn't ~~imagine~~ ^{we} ~~it~~ ^{otherwise} differently.) This ostensive teaching of ~~the~~ words, one may say, ^{makes} ~~fixes~~ an associative connection between the word and the thing. But what does that mean? Well, it may mean various things; but probably what first comes to one's mind ~~is that~~ occurs to one is that an image of the thing comes before the child's mind when it hears the word. But suppose that happens - is that the purpose

purpose of the word? - ~~It~~ ^{it's} ~~may~~ be ~~its~~ purpose. - I can ^{such a use of} imagine words (^{i.e.} ~~here~~ series of sounds), ~~having an application of~~ ^{To pronounce them would be like} this sort. (~~Their utterance is so to speak the~~ striking ~~of~~ a key on ^a piano of ^{images} ~~ideas~~.) But in ^{our} the language (^{of}) it is not the ~~purpose~~ of the words to call up ^{images} ~~ideas~~. (^{Though} ~~it~~ ^{this} may, of course, ^{be found to be helpful} ~~turn out that this is conducive~~ to their ^{purpose} ~~real aim~~.)

But if that is what the ostensive teaching brings about, - shall I say that it brings about the understanding of the word? Doesn't ^{he} ~~someone~~ understand the ^{order} ~~word~~ "slab!" if he acts in such and such a way on hearing it? - The ostensive teaching ^{indeed} helped to ^{bring} ~~produce~~ this ^{about} ~~no~~ doubt, but only in connection with a certain ^{training} ~~course~~ of instruction. With a different ^{training} ~~course~~ of instruction the same ostensive teaching of these words would have brought about ~~quite~~ a different understanding. - Of ^{this} ~~more~~ ^{at a} later ^{point}.
 "By ^{up} I connecting ~~the rod with~~ ^{with this rod} this lever by means of ^a ~~the~~ peg, I ^{put} ~~the~~ brake ^{in order} ~~ready for use~~." - Yes, given all the rest of the ^{mechanism} mechanism. Only together with this ^{is} ~~is~~ it a brake lever; and ~~without~~ ~~detached from~~ its support it isn't even a lever, but ~~can be all sorts~~ ^{it may be anything} of things, or nothing.

10. ^{In the use of} ~~the~~ the language (^{of}) ~~is used in practice~~ the one party calls out the words and the other acts according to them. ~~But~~ ^{however} ~~In~~ the ~~instruction~~ ^{we will find} teaching of this language there ~~will be~~ this procedure: the ~~one who~~ ^{pupil} ~~is learning~~ calls the ~~objects~~ ^{blocks} by ^{their} names; that is, he ^{pronounces} ~~speaks~~ the word when the teacher points to the ^{block} ~~stone~~. - In fact ^{we} ~~you~~ will find here an ~~even the~~ simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words ^{which} ~~that~~ the teacher ^{pronounces for him} ~~recites to him~~: Both ^{of these exercises already primitive uses of} ~~processes that resemble~~ language.

language.

We may even imagine that the ~~entire process of the~~ use of ^{we make} ~~the~~ words in (4) is one of those games by means of which ^{our} children learn ~~the~~ language. I will call these "language games", and I will frequently speak of a primitive language as a language game.

And one might call the ~~process~~ ^{exercises} of calling the ~~stones~~ ^{blocks} by their names and of repeating the words ^{which the teacher has pronounced} ~~that has been spoken out~~ language games as well. Think of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~various~~ uses ~~that are~~ made of words in *nursery-rhymes*.

11.

Let us now consider an extension of the language (4): Besides the four words "cube", "column", etc., let it contain a series of words ~~that are app which is~~ applied in the way ~~in which~~ the grocer in (2) applied the numerals, - it ^{may} ~~can~~ be the ~~entire~~ series of the ~~xx~~ letters of the alphabet; further, ^{at there to} ~~two~~ words, ^{let us chose} ~~which we may pronounce~~ "there" and "this", since this ^{already} suggests ~~roughly~~ their purpose, - they ^{to be} ~~are~~ used in connection with a pointing ^{gesture} ~~movement of the hand~~; and finally let us use certain ^{bits} ~~little squares~~ of paper of various colours. A now gives a command of ^{this} the sort: "d slab there" - at the same time ^{showing his} ~~letting the~~ assistant ~~see~~ a coloured square, and with the word "there" pointing to ^{certain} a place. B takes from the supply of slabs ^a ~~the~~ slab of the same colour ~~of~~ as the coloured square for each letter of the alphabet up to "d", and brings it to the place which A indicates. - On other occasions A gives the command "this there" - with "this" he points ^{at} ~~to~~ a building ^{block} ~~stone~~ - and so on.

12.

When the child learns this language it has to learn the series of "numerals" "a", "b", "c", . . . by heart. - And it has to learn their use. Will an ostensive teaching of words ^{enter} ~~into~~ into this

this instruction also? - Well, ~~one~~ will point at slabs, for instance, and count: "a,b,c slabs". ^{There would be} a greater similarity ~~with~~ ^{between} the ~~ostensive~~ teaching in ~~example~~ (4) ^{and} ~~would appear in~~ the ostensive teaching of numerals ^{if} these are not used for counting but ^{refer to} ~~rather to indicate~~ groups of objects ~~that can be~~ grasped ^{by} the eye. ^{In} ~~this~~ way children learn the use of the first five or six cardinal number ~~numerals~~.

^{So we teach} "there" and "this" ~~taught~~ ^{imagine} ostensively? - ~~how~~ you might teach their use. You point to places and things; # but ^{in this case} ~~the~~ pointing occurs in the use of the words ^{also} ~~as well~~, and not simply in the ^{teaching} ~~learning~~ of ~~it~~ the use. -

13.

Now ~~what~~ do the words of this language denote? - ~~How can this~~ ^{how is this to appear, unless} ~~show itself~~ What they denote - ~~except~~ in the way they are used? And this is what we have described. The expression, "this word denotes ^{so as to} ~~these~~" would ~~have~~ ^{now become} ~~them to be~~ a part of this description. Or: the description ^{is to} ~~should~~ be put in the form: "The word denotes".

Now ^{it} ~~one can~~ certainly ^{is possible to condense} ~~shorten~~ the description of the use of the word "slab" ^{into saying} ~~in this way, and say~~ that this word denotes this object. ~~This is what~~ one would do, ~~for instance,~~ if the question were, ^{for instance,} ~~to~~ ^{block which} prevent the misunderstanding ~~of thinking~~ that the word "slab" referred to the kind of ~~building stone~~ that we actually call "cube", ^{or} ~~the~~ ^{particular} sort of "reference", ~~this is~~, ^{however} i.e. ~~all the rest of the game~~ ^{were} ~~with~~ ~~everything else about the use of these words~~, ~~is~~ familiar.

Similarly one may say that the signs "a", "b", "c", etc. denote numbers, ^{if} ~~when~~ ^{is to} this ~~remove~~ the misunderstanding ~~of thinking~~ that "a", "b" ^{or} "c", play the role in ~~the~~ ^{our} language which actually is

is played by "cube", "column", "slab". And one can say also that "c" denotes this number and not that, - when this is to explain, say, that the letters are to be used in the order "a", "b", "c", "d" etc., and not "a", "b", "d", "c".

But ~~because~~ ^{by} you assimilating in this way ~~the~~ description^s of the uses of ~~these~~ words to one another, their uses ~~do~~n't ^{become} more similar. For, as we have seen, their uses ^{are} of widely different sorts.

14

It has
Think of the tools in a tool chest: There is a hammer, ~~a~~ ~~pincers~~ pincers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a pot of glue, glue, nails and screws. - ^{As} different as the functions of these objects ~~are,~~ ~~just as different~~ are the functions of words. (And there are similarities in the one case and in the other.)

15

What confuses us, ~~of course,~~ is the uniformity of their appearance when ~~we~~ ^{we hear the} words ~~are spoken to us or when we meet them~~ ^{or see them written} ~~in writing~~ or in print. For their ~~application~~ ^{use} isn't so clearly there ~~in front of us.~~ ^{before our eyes} Especially not ~~if~~ ^{when} we are ~~philosophizing~~ ^{doing philosophy}.

16

~~It is like~~ ^{As} when we ~~look~~ ^{look} into the driver's cabin of a locomotive: we see handles ~~that~~ ^{which} all look more or less alike. (That's ~~is~~ ^{natural} understandable, since they are all ~~supposed~~ ^{made} to be ~~held~~ ^{held} with the hand.) ^{But} one is the handle of a ~~valve~~ ^{valve} that can be ~~more~~ ^{regulated by} continuous^{degrees} ~~over~~ ^{(it regulates the opening of an air valve);} ~~the~~ ^{an} other is the handle of a switch, which has only two ^{effective} positions, ~~in~~ ^{it's either shut or open} ~~which it is effective~~; a third is the handle of a brake ~~rod~~, the ~~more strongly~~ ^{harder} you pull it the more ~~strongly~~ the brake is applied; a fourth, the handle of a pump, works only as long as it is

it is moved back and forth.

17

If we say: "every word of ~~the~~ language denotes something", - then, so far, ^{we've said} nothing ~~at all~~ ^{that is,} ~~has been said~~; unless we explain ~~precisely~~ ^{wished} what distinction we wish to make. (It might be that we ^{||} wanted to distinguish the words of language ~~(?)~~ from ~~words~~ ^{(without meaning) which} occur in Lewis Carroll's poems.)

18

Suppose someone said: "All tools serve to modify something. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw the ~~form~~ ^{shape} of the board, etc.." - ~~And what is modified by the ruler, the glue pot, the nails? //~~ And what ^{does} ~~is~~ the ruler modify, ~~is~~ the glue pot, ~~is~~ the nails? - "Our knowledge of the length of ^a ~~the~~ thing, the temperature of the glue and the firmness of the ^{box} ~~chest~~." -

19

Would anything be gained by this assimilation ^{of our} ~~under one~~ expression? - The expression "the name of an object" ^{very straightforwardly} is ~~probably best~~ applied where the ~~name~~ ^{mark} is actually ^{a mark} on the object ^{itself} ~~which it denotes~~.

Suppose then that there are ^{marks} ~~signs~~ scratched on the tools which A uses in building. ~~When~~ ^{if} A shows his assistant a ~~sign~~ ^{character} of this sort, then the assistant brings the tool which bears that sign/~~mark, character~~/.

In this and in more or less similar ways a name denotes a thing, and ~~is~~ given to a thing. (Of this more later.) - It will often prove ^{useful} if we say to ourselves in doing philosophy: Naming something, ~~that~~ ^{attaching} is something like ~~attaching~~ ^{a label to} ~~some plate on~~ a thing. -

20

What about the colour-samples that A shows to B, - do they belong to the language? As you like. They don't belong to ^{our} ~~the~~ ^{spoken} ~~verbal~~ language; but if I say to someone, "Pronounce ~~the~~

the word "~~the~~", you will ^{call} ~~count~~ the second "the" also a part of the sentence. Yet it plays a very similar role to that of a coloured ^{bit of paper the} ~~square~~ in language game (H): it is a sample of what the other person is supposed to say, just as the coloured square is a sample of what B is supposed to bring.

It is the most natural thing and ~~it~~ causes ~~the~~ least confusion if we ^{count} ~~reckon~~ ~~the~~ samples among the instruments of ~~the~~ language.

21

We may say that in language (H) we have various parts of speech. For the functions of "slab" and "cube" are more alike than the functions of "slab" and "d". But ^{the way} ~~how~~ we classify the words together as ~~various~~ parts of speech will depend on the purpose of the classification, and on our inclination.

Think of the different points of view ^{according to} ~~from~~ which one might classify tools as different kinds of tools. Or chess pieces as different kinds of pieces.

22

Don't let it bother you that the languages (H) and (K) consist only of commands. If you are inclined to say that they are therefore incomplete, then ask yourself whether our language is complete; whether it was complete before the symbolism of chemistry and the infinitesimal calculus were embodied in it: for these are, ^{as it were} ~~so to speak~~, suburbs of our language. (And with how many houses or streets does a ~~city~~ ^{town} begin to be a ~~city~~ ^{town}?) ~~One~~ ^{We} can regard our language as an ~~ancient~~ ^{ancient} ~~city~~ ^{town}, ~~the center a maze~~ ^{the center a maze} of narrow alleys and squares, old and new houses, ~~houses~~ ^{houses} with additions from various periods; and all this surrounded by a mass of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses.

houses.

One can easily imagine a language which consists~~ed~~ only of ~~dispatches reports~~ commands and ~~announcements~~ in battle. - Or a language which consists~~ed~~ only of questions and an expression of affirmation and ~~and~~ denial - ^a and countless other~~s~~.^{things} - And to imagine a language means to imagine a way of living.

23.

But let's see: is the ^{call} "slab!" in ~~example~~ (4) a sentence or a word? - If ~~it's~~ a word, ^{surely} it hasn't ~~any~~ the same meaning as the word ^{"slab"} ~~that's~~ pronounced the same in our ordinary language, for in ^{our} language (4) it is a ^{call} ~~word~~; but if it's a sentence, then ~~surely~~ it isn't the elliptical sentence "slab!" of our language.--As regard^s the first question, you can call "slab!" a word, and you can ~~also~~ call it a sentence; perhaps ^{best} ~~fittingly~~ a "degenerate sentence"(as one speaks of a degenerate hyperbola). And it is precisely our "elliptical" sentence.-- But ^{isn't this} ~~that is~~ surely just a shortened form of the sentence, "Bring me a slab"? And there isn't ~~any~~ such ^a sentence in ^{the language} (4).-- But why should ~~it~~ rather call the sentence "Bring me a slab" a lengthening of the sentence "slab!"?-- Because the person who calls out "slab!" really means "Bring me a slab!".-- But how do you do ~~this~~, meaning this while you say "slab"? Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself? And why should I, in order to say what you mean by the ^{call} ~~word~~ "slab!", translate this expression into another? And if they mean the same, - why shouldn't I say: "When you say 'slab!' you mean 'slāb!'" ? - Or: Why shouldn't it be possible for you to mean "slab!", if you can mean "Bring me the slab"? -- But when I shout "slab!", then surely what I want is

want is that he ~~shall~~ ^{shall} bring me a slab.-- Certainly, * but does "wanting this" consist in the fact that you ^(in some way) think ~~in any form~~ a different sentence from the one you speak? -

~~was~~ But if someone says 'Bring me a slab' it looks ^(now) as though he could mean this expression as one long word, - corresponding ^{that is} ~~simply~~ to the ~~word~~ one word 'slab!.'" - Can one then mean it sometimes as one word and sometimes as four words? And how does one generally mean it? - I believe that what we shall be inclined to say is that we mean the sentence as a sentence of four words when we are using it as contrasted with sentences ^{like} ~~such as~~, "Hand me a slab", "Bring him a slab", "Bring two slabs", etc.: as contrasted, that is, with sentences which contain the words of our command in ~~different~~ ^{other} combinations. - But what does using one sentence ^{is} ~~in~~ contrasted ^{to} ~~with~~ other ~~s~~ sentences consist in? Does one have these ^{other} sentences in mind at the time? And all of them? And while one is speaking the sentence, or before or afterwards? - No. Even if such an explanation has some attraction for us, we have only to ^{consider} ~~think~~ for a moment what actually happens in order to see that we are on ^{a wrong track} ~~the wrong road here~~. We say we use this command ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ contrast ^{to} ~~with~~ other sentences because our language contains the possibility of these other sentences. ~~// because in our language these other sentences are possible.~~ Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner who had frequently heard someone giving the command "Bring me a slab", might suppose that this entire series of sounds was one word and corresponded, say, to the word 'building ^{block} ~~stone~~' in his language. If he had then to give this command himself, ~~he~~ would perhaps pronounce it differently and we

we should say: He pronounces ~~xxx~~ it so ^{queerly} ~~curiously~~ because he ^{thinks} ~~takes~~ it ^{is} ~~to be~~ one word. - But ~~then~~ ^{something} doesn't ~~anything~~ different happen in him when he utters ~~this sentence~~, corresponding to the fact that ^{views regards} ~~he takes~~ the sentence ^{as} ~~to be~~ one word? The same thing may happen in him, or again something different may. What happens in you when you give a command of that sort? Are you conscious that it consists of four words while you are uttering it? Of course, you ^{know} ~~have a mastery of~~ this language, & in which there are those other sentences also, & but is this ^{knowing} ~~something~~ something that happens while you are uttering the sentence? - And I have admitted, ^{that} the foreigner ^{who views the sentence differently} ~~will probably give the sentence he views differently~~ a different pronunciation; but what we call ^{his} ~~the~~ wrong ^{idea} view doesn't ^{necessarily} ~~have to do~~ ^{consist} in anything that accompanies the uttering of the command. (Of ~~this~~ ~~more~~ later.)

25

The sentence is not 'elliptical' because it ^{omit} ~~leaves out~~ something ^{that} ~~we mean~~ when we utter it, but because it is ^{think} ~~shortened~~ ^{abbreviated, as} ~~shortened~~ ~~and~~ ~~compared~~ with a particular standard of our grammar. - One might ~~make~~ the objection: "You admit that the ^{abbreviated} ~~shortened~~ and the ^{unabbreviated} ~~unshortened~~ sentence have the same meaning. ^{Well} ~~What~~ that meaning have they?" - ^{Isn't} ~~there~~ ^{an} ~~one~~ ~~verbal~~ expression for this meaning?" - But doesn't ^{their} ~~the~~ identical meaning ~~of the sentences~~ consist in their ^{use} having the same application? (In Russian they say "stone red" instead of "the stone is red"; ^{don't they get the full meaning, as they} ~~is the copula left out of the~~ ^{leave out the copula} ~~meaning for them?~~ or do they ^{it} ~~think~~ ^{without pronouncing it,} ~~the copula~~ to themselves? -

26

One can ^{also} ~~also~~ imagine a language ~~also~~ in which B, in reply to a question by A, ^{has to report to him} ~~informs him~~ of the number of slabs or cubes

(stacked up in some place) or shapes certain blocks.
cubes by ~~shape~~; or the colours and forms of ~~the~~ building-~~blocks~~
~~that lie in one place and another.~~

~~The purpose of such a report might then be: "five slabs."~~

Such a report might ^{be of the form} ~~then be~~: "five slabs.". Now what is the difference between the report, or assertion, "five slabs.", and the command "five slabs!?" - ^{it is} ~~what~~, the role which ^{saying} ~~the utterance of~~ these words plays in ^{our} ~~the~~ language games. But ^{probably} the tone of voice in which they are uttered will ~~probably~~ be different ^{too} ~~as well~~; and the ^{facial} expression and various other things. But ^{it may well be} ~~we can also imagine~~ that the tone of voice is the same - ^{in both cases} for a command and a report ~~can~~ be uttered in ^{a lot of} ~~various~~ different tones of voice and with ^{a lot of different} ~~various~~ facial expressions - and ~~the~~ the difference lies ^{may, only, that is done with} in ~~the application~~

^{the words "five slabs"} ~~alone.~~ - (Of course we might ~~also~~ use the words "assertion" and "command" ^{just} to indicate a grammatical ^{form} ~~construction~~ of a sentence ~~or~~ a ^{particular} ~~vocal~~ intonation, just as one ^{would} calls the sentence, "Isn't it glorious weather today?", a question, ^{or} ~~even~~ though it is used ~~like~~ as an assertion.) We could imagine a language in which all assertions had the form and the intonation of a rhetorical question; ^{in which} or every command ^{had} the form: "Would you like to ~~do that~~?". One ^{might} ~~would then~~ ^{in this case} ~~perhaps~~ say: "What he says has the form of a question but ^{it} is really a command", i.e. has the function of a command. ~~in the practical employment of language.~~ (Similarly one says "you will do ~~that~~" ^{not as a prophecy but as a command. What ^{would} make it the one, ~~and~~ what the other?)}

27

Frege's view that ~~in~~ an assertion ~~there is~~ contained a Annahme supposal, and that it is this ^{which} ~~is~~ is asserted, is based really on the possibility ~~that there is~~ in our language of writing every

every assertion ~~sentence~~ in the form: "It is asserted that so and so is the case". But "that so and so is the case" is not a sentence in our language - ~~it~~ ^{this} is not ^{yet} a move in our language game. And if ~~write~~ ^{write} instead of "It is asserted that ...", "It is asserted: so and so is the case", then ~~in this case~~ the words "It is asserted" are ~~quite~~ superfluous.

We might ~~very well~~ write every assertion in the form of a question followed by an affirmative reply; thus instead of "It is raining", "Is it raining? Yes.". Would that show that ~~in~~ every assertion ~~there is~~ contained a question?

28

Of course one has a right to use ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~assertion~~ ^{sign} in contrast, for instance, to a question mark. The mistake is only ~~in~~ thinking that the assertion ~~is~~ consists ~~of~~ ^{of} two acts, the ~~consideration~~ ^{consideration} and the ~~asserting~~ ^{asserting} (assigning the truth value, or ~~something of the sort~~ ^{whatever you call it}), and that we perform these acts according to the signs ~~of~~ the sentence, ~~as~~ ^{almost} as we sing from notes. ~~we~~ ^{What can} ~~right~~ ^{be} ~~certainly~~ compared ^{to} ~~reading~~ ^{the singing from notes} ~~aloud~~ ^{is the}, or ~~to~~ ^{to oneself} ~~the~~ ^{of the} ~~signs~~ ^{signs of the} ~~of the~~ ^{the} sentence ~~with~~ ~~singing~~ ~~from~~ ~~notes~~; but not ~~the~~ ^{the} "meaning" (thinking) ~~of~~ the sentence that is read.

29

The important ~~point~~ ^{point about of} ~~of~~ Frege's ~~mark~~ ^{sign} of assertion ~~is~~ ~~perhaps~~ ^{put} ~~best~~ ^{by} ~~saying~~ it indicates clearly the beginning of the sentence. - ~~This~~ ^{for} is important: ~~our~~ ~~philosophical~~ difficulties concerning the nature of "negation" and ~~of~~ "thinking", ~~spring~~ ^{are due to} originate in a sense, ~~from~~ ^{realise} the fact that we don't ~~see~~ that an ~~assertion~~ ^{assertion} sentence "⊢ not p", or "⊢ I believe p", and the ~~sentence~~ ^{assertion} "⊢ p" have "p" in common, but not "⊢ p". (For if I hear someone say ^{the words} "it's raining", then I don't know what he has said if I don't know

know whether I have heard the beginning of the sentence.)

30

But how many kinds of sentences are there, ~~though?~~ ^{is it} Assertions, questions and commands, ~~perhaps?~~ - There are innumerable kinds: innumerable ~~different~~ kinds of ~~use~~ applications of ~~anything~~ ^{all} that we call "signs", "words", "sentences". And this variety is nothing ^{that is} fixed, given once and for all, but new types of language, new language games - as we may say - ~~spring up~~ ^{come into being} and others ~~become~~ ^{become} obsolete and are forgotten. (~~We can get~~ ^{can we get if we look at} A rough picture of this ~~from~~ ^{transform} the changes ^{which} happen in ~~the~~ mathematics.)

The expression "language game" is ^{used here} ~~supposed~~ to emphasise ~~here~~ that the speaking of the language is part of an activity, ^{part} of a way of living, of human beings.

To get an idea of the enormous variety of ~~the~~ language games ^{consider} ~~before your mind by~~ these ~~and other~~ ^{and others} examples:

^{Giving} ~~commands~~, and acting according to commands;

^{giving a} description ^{of} an object ^{by describing what it look like} ~~according to its appearance~~, or by

^{giving its} ~~according to~~ measurements;

producing an object according to a description (drawing);

reporting an ~~course of~~ events;

^{making} ~~putting forward~~ conjectures about ^{what will happen} ~~the course of~~ events;

^{making} ~~setting up~~ a hypothesis and testing it;

presenting ~~of~~ the results of an experiment in tables and

diagrams;

^{acting a play} ~~performing in a theater~~;

singing a catch;

^{asking} ~~guessing~~ riddles; ^{and guessing them};

~~riddles;~~

- making a joke, or telling one;
- solving an ~~example~~^{problem} in applied arithmetic;
- translating from one language into another;
- ~~requesting~~^{requesting}, thanking, swearing, greeting, praying.

- It is interesting to compare the variety of the instruments of ~~our~~ language and of ~~their various uses~~^{their various uses} ~~the ways they are applied~~ - the variety of ~~the parts of speech and of the~~^{words of} kinds of sentences - with what logicians have said about the structure of ~~our~~ language. (~~the~~^{including} the author of ~~the~~ Tractatus Logico-philosophicus ~~as well~~.)

31

If we don't see that there is a multitude of language games, we are inclined to ask: "What is a question?" Is it the statement that I don't know so and so, or ^{is it} the statement that I wish the other person would tell me ...? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty? - And is the cry "help!" ^{such} a description? ~~of this sort?~~

Think of what widely different things we call "descriptions": the description of the position of a body by means of its coordinates; the description of ~~the sensation of~~^{changes in} a sensation of pain.

~~Of course~~ ^{one can replace} ~~it instead of~~ the usual form of ~~the~~ a question ^{by} that of ^a the statement or ^a description: ^{such as} "I want to know whether...", or "I am in doubt ~~whether~~ whether..." - but one hasn't thereby brought the different language games any nearer to one another.

The significance of ~~such~~^{this} possibilities of transforming, for instance, all ~~declarative sentences~~^{assertions} into sentences that begin

begin with the ~~words~~ ^{words} "I think" or "I believe" (i.e. so to speak into descriptions of my ~~mental states~~ ^{mental states}) will appear later.

32. It is ~~sometimes~~ ^{sometimes} said: animals don't speak, because they lack ~~even~~ ^{necessary} the intellectual capacities. And this means: 'they don't think, therefore they don't speak'. But ~~the fact is that~~ they just don't speak. Or ~~rather~~ ^{rather}: they don't use language. (If we ~~do~~ ^{except} ~~the~~ ^{Giving orders} most primitive forms of language.) ~~including~~ ^{questions}, asking, ~~describing~~ ^{describing}, prattling, belong to our natural history just as walking, eating, drinking, playing do. (It makes no difference here whether ~~we~~ speaking is ^{done} with the mouth or ^{done} with the hand.)

33 This is connected with the ~~fact~~ ^{fact} that ~~we~~ ^{we think that the} learning of ~~the~~ language consists in naming objects; ~~viz.~~ ^{viz.} human beings, ~~shapes~~ ^{shapes}, colours, ~~aches~~ ^{aches}, moods, numbers, etc.. - As we have said, # naming is something like ~~fastening something~~ ^{fastening something} a label to ~~it~~ ^{And this} a thing. ~~One~~ ^{might} call ~~this~~ ^{this} a preparation for the use of a word. But for what is it a preparation?

34 "We name the things and ~~now~~ ^{we can} talk about them. ~~We can~~ refer to them in what we say." - As though with ~~the act of naming~~ ^{all that happens after it} ~~we~~ ^{were} already ~~to hand~~ ^{fixed} what to go on to do afterwards. As though there were only one thing ~~that is~~ called "speaking about things". Whereas ~~actually~~ ^{actually} we do ~~things of~~ ^{of things} the most widely different kinds with our sentences. Think only of the interjections, - With their ~~entirely~~ ^{entirely} different functions.

very

- Water!
- Away! ~~Get out!~~
- Ouch!
- Help!

~~Beautiful!~~ Beautiful! ~~lovely!~~

No!

Are you still inclined to call these words ~~the~~ "names of objects"?

35

In the languages (4) and (1/2) there was no such thing as asking what ~~a~~ thing is called. This and its correlate, the ostensive explanation, definition, is, we might say, a separate language game. That means really: we are ~~taught up~~ ^{taught} trained, to ask "What is this called?", - and then the name ~~is given~~ ^{is given}. ~~And~~ ^{And} there is also a language game: ~~inventing~~ ^{inventing} a name for something. ~~That is, of~~ ^{i.e., to say} ~~the~~ "This is called...." and then ~~using~~ ^{to use} the new name. (In this way, ~~for instance~~ ^{o.g.}, children name their dolls and then go on to talk about them. In this connection consider ~~at the same time how~~ what a ^{very} special use ^{we make} of a personal name: ~~it is used~~ we use it to call someone.) ~~// ...how special that use of a personal name is with which we call the person so named. //~~

Now ~~we~~ ^{we} can ~~give an~~ ostensive definition ~~of~~ a personal name, a colour word, ~~the~~ name of a material, a numeral, ~~the name~~ ~~of a direction~~ // the name of a point of the compass, etc., etc.. The definition of two: "This is called 'two'" - pointing to two nuts - is perfectly exact. - But how can you define "two" in this way? The person to whom you ~~are~~ giving the definition ~~doesn't~~ ^{won't} know then, what ^{it is} you wish to call "two"; he'll suppose that you ~~are~~ ^{have} called this group of nuts "two". - He may suppose this, ~~but~~ perhaps he won't. ~~suppose it.~~ He might also do just the opposite: when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts he might take this ~~the~~ ^{to be} the name

name of a number. And equally, if I give an ostensive definition of a personal name, he might take ~~it~~ ^{it} to be the name of a colour, the name of a race, even the name of a ~~direction~~ ^{point of the compass}. That is, the ostensive definition can in ~~all~~ ^{all} cases be interpreted in ~~one~~ ^{this} way ~~or~~ ^{in that way.} ~~and also in others.~~

36

You may say: "Two" can be defined ostensively only in ~~this~~ ^{this} way: "This number is called 'two'"; For the word "number" ~~shows~~ ^{shows here,} ~~what~~ ^{our} ~~place~~ ^{our} in ~~the~~ language - in ~~the~~ ^{our} grammar - we ~~assign~~ ^{assign to} the word; but this means that the word "number" must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood. - The word "number" in the definition does ~~certainly~~ ^{indeed} indicate this place, ~~the~~ ^{the} post ~~to~~ ^{to} which we assign the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings ~~in this way~~ ^{to} by saying "This colour is called so and so", "This length is called so and so", etc.. That is: misunderstandings are often avoided in this way. But can the word "colour", ~~then~~, or "length", be understood only in this way? - Well, we ~~shall~~ ^{shall} have to explain them. ~~That is,~~ ^{That is,} explain them by ~~other~~ ^{means of} words, ~~that is!~~ And what about the last explanation in this chain? (Don't say "There isn't any 'last' explanation". ~~This~~ ^{This} is exactly as though you ~~were to say~~ ^{were to say}, "There isn't any last house in this street: you can always build ~~one~~ ^{another}.")

~~Whether~~ ^{is necessary} the word "number" in the ostensive definition of "two" ~~is necessary~~ ^{is necessary} depends ~~on~~ ^{upon} whether he ~~understands~~ ^{understands} this word differently ~~from the way I wish him to.~~ ^{from the way I wish him to.} ~~And this will depend on the circumstances~~ ^{And this will depend on the circumstances} under which ~~it~~ ^{the definition} is given and on the person to whom I give it.

give it.

And how he "understands" the explanation ^{will} appear ^{the way} in ~~the~~ he makes use of ~~the~~ word explained.

37

One might say ~~then~~: The ostensive definition explains the use - the meaning - of the word if it is already clear ~~in general~~ ^{kind of} what ^{role} the word is to play in the language. Thus if I know that someone wants to explain a colour word to me, ~~then~~ the explanation "This ^{is} called 'sepia'" will ^{make} ~~help~~ me ~~to get an~~ understanding of the word. - And you can say this ^{as long as you remember} ~~if you don't forget~~ that ~~there are~~ all sorts of questions ^{now attach to} ~~connected with~~ the words "know" ^{to} ~~or~~ "be clear".

You have to know something ~~already~~ ^{before you can} ~~in order to be able to~~ ask what ^{something} ~~it~~ is called. But what do you have to know?

If you show someone the king in a ^{set of} ~~chess~~ ^{men} and say, "This is the king of chess", you do not thereby explain to him the use of this piece, - unless he already knows the rules of the game except for this last point: the ^{shape} ~~form~~ of the king ~~piece~~. We can imagine that he has learned the rules of the game without ever having been shown a real chessman. The ^{shape} ~~form~~ of ~~the~~ chessman corresponds here to the sound or the shape of a word.

But we can also imagine someone's having learned the game without ever having learned or formulated rules. He ~~has~~ perhaps first learned very simple games on boards by watching them and ~~has~~ proceeded to more and more complicated ones. To him also you might give the explanation, "This is the king", if, for instance, you are showing him chess ^{men} ~~pieces~~ of an unusual ^{shape} ~~form~~. And this explanation teaches him the use of the ^{piece} ~~figure~~ only because, as we

we might say, ~~the place in which it was put was already prepared.~~ ^{we had in the game already prepared the place in which it was}
 to be put. Or ~~again~~: We shall say the explanation teaches him the use, only
 when the place ~~is~~ ^{has} already ^{been} prepared. And it is ~~so here~~ ^{prepared in this case} not because
 the person to whom we are giving the explanation already knows
 rules, but because he ^{in a different sense} has already mastered ~~the~~ ^a game, ~~in a different~~
~~sense.~~

Consider still another case: I explain the game of chess to
 someone and begin by showing him a piece, ~~and~~ saying, "This is the
 king". # ~~It~~ can move in this and this way, etc. etc. " - In this
 case we shall say: the words "This is the king" (or, "This is called
 'king'") ~~are an explanation~~ ^{explain the use} of the words ^("the king") only if the person ^{we teach} ~~learning~~
 already "knows what a piece in a game is": when he has already played
 other games, ~~say~~, or ~~has~~ watched ~~the play~~ ^{the games played by other people} "with understanding",
 and ~~so forth~~ ^{the like}. And only then will he be ^{in a position} able to ask relevantly, in
 learning the game, "What's this ~~is~~ called?" - ^{that is} ~~namely~~, this piece.

We may say: ~~it is sensible for someone's~~ ^{there is only sense in} asking ^{for} ~~the~~ name
~~is only~~ if he ~~knows~~ ^{already} what to do with ~~it~~ ^{the name}.

For ~~we~~ can imagine ~~also~~ that the person ^{I have} ~~who is~~ asked, answers,
 "decide ~~on~~ ^{give it to a} the name yourself", - and then ~~the person who asked the~~
~~question~~ ^{I should} ~~would have to~~ ~~make himself responsible for everything~~
~~provide~~ ^{catch on to} ~~everything~~ ^{my} ~~himself~~.

38

Anyone who comes into a foreign ~~land~~ ^{country} ~~has~~ ^{will often have} frequently to
 learn the language ~~of the inhabitants~~ there ~~through~~ ^{by} ostensive
 explanations ~~definitions~~ which ~~they~~ ^{people} give him; and he ~~has~~ ^{will often have} frequently to guess
 the interpretation of these explanations, ~~often~~ ^{it will guess it sometimes} correctly, ~~often~~ ^{sometimes}
 wrongly.

And now we can say, I think:

And now we ~~say~~ ^{can} say, I think: Augustine describes ^{the child's} ~~the~~ learning ^{of to speak} ~~of human language~~ as though the child ^{had come} ~~came~~ to a foreign country ~~and~~ ^{without} ~~did not~~ understanding ^{it's} ~~the country's~~ language; that is, as though the child already had a language, only not this one. Or, as though the child could already think but ~~could~~ not speak yet. And here "think" ^{would} ~~means~~ something like: speak to ^{him} ~~myself~~.

39.

But what if someone objected: "It is ~~not~~ true that ~~someone~~ you ^{already} must have mastered a language game ~~already~~ in order to understand an ostensive definition, ^{of course, you've got} ~~but he's only obviously~~ to know (or guess) what the ^{man who gives the explanation} ~~person explaining~~ is pointing to: ^{e.g.,} ~~whether, for~~ ~~instance,~~ to the ^{shape} ~~form~~ of ^{the} ~~an~~ object, or to its colour, or to the ^{of objects} ~~number~~, etc., etc. ." - And what does "pointing to the ^{shape} ~~form~~", "pointing to the colour" etc. consist in, ~~the~~? Point to a piece of paper. - And now point to its ^{shape} ~~form~~ - now to its colour - now to its number (that sounds queer). - Well, how did you do it? ~~x~~ You will say you "meant" something different each time you pointed. And if I ask ^{you} ~~how that takes place~~ ^{you do this}, you will say you ^{concentrate} ~~directed~~ your attention on the colour, ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{shape} ~~form~~ etc.. But ^{now} ~~then~~ I ask again how this ^{is done.} ~~takes place~~.

marvelous

Suppose someone points to a vase and says ~~x~~ "Look at this ~~gorgeous~~ ^{wonderful} ~~glorious~~ blue! - the shape doesn't matter." - Or, "Look at this ~~magnificent~~ ^{something} shape! - the colour ^{is} ~~is~~ unimportant." - Undoubtedly you will do different ^{in each case} ~~things~~ if you ^{do what he asks you} ~~comply with both these requests~~. But do you always do the same ^{thing} when you direct your attention to the colour? Imagine various cases. - ^{e.g. these:-} ~~I will suggest some:-~~

"Is this blue the same as that? Do you see a

see a difference?"-

You are mixing ^{paints on a palette} colours and ~~you~~ say, "This blue of the sky is hard to ~~find~~ ^{to get}."

"It's going to be fine, you can see the blue sky already ~~again~~."

"Look what different effects these two blues give."

"Do you see ~~that~~ blue book ~~over there~~? Please ^{fetch} ~~bring~~ it."

"This blue ~~signal~~ light means"

"What's ~~is~~ this blue called? - is it 'indigo' -?"

Directing the attention to the colour sometimes means shutting out the outlines of the shape with ~~one's~~ ^{your} hand, or, not, ^{looking} directly ~~one's~~ ^{it means} gaze at the contour of the thing; sometimes ~~starting~~ at the thing and trying to remember where one has seen this colour before.

You direct your attention to the shape, ^{of a thing} sometimes by ~~sketching~~ ^{drawing} it, sometimes by ~~squinting~~ ^{half closing the eyes} so as not to see the colour clearly, etc., etc. . . I ~~wish~~ ^{wish} to say: ~~this~~ ^{that} is the sort of thing that happens while ~~one~~ ^{you} directs ~~the~~ ^{your} attention to ~~this and that~~ ^{something}. But ~~this is~~ ^{it isn't just this which makes} not the only thing ~~that allows~~ ^{that} us to say someone is directing his attention to the shape, to the colour, etc.. Just as a "making a move in chess" does ~~not~~ ^{only} consist in ~~the fact that~~ ^{pushing} a piece ~~is~~ ^{from} ~~pushed across the board in such and such a way,~~ ^{here to there} ~~but also not~~ in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the move ~~in the person~~ ^{making it} - but rather in the circumstances that we call ~~"taking~~ ^{playing} ~~part in a~~ ^{game of chess} chess game", or "solving a chess problem", and ~~so for it~~ ^{we like}.

40 But suppose someone says, "I always do the same thing when I direct my attention to ~~the~~ ^a shape: I follow the ~~contour~~ ^{outline} with my

my eyes ^{with the} ~~and~~ feeling.....". And suppose this person gives to someone ~~the~~ ostensive ~~definition~~ ^{explanation}, "This ^{is} ~~is~~ ^a ~~circle~~" ^{by} pointing, ~~with all these experiences,~~ ^{with having all these experiences} to a circular object; ~~Can't the other person still interpret this explanation differently,~~ ^{al} though he sees that the person giving ~~the explanation~~ ^{it} follows the shape with his eyes, ~~and even though~~ ^{if} he feels what the person giving the explanation feels? That ~~is,~~ ^{is to say} this "interpretation" ~~can also~~ ^{may} consist in the ~~use~~ ^{use} which he ~~makes~~ ^{now} ~~uses~~ ^{makes} of the word, ~~for instance~~ ^{e.g. in his} ~~what he~~ pointing to ~~which he is~~ ^{such + such an object then} given the command: "Point to a circle". - For neither the expression, "meaning the explanation in such and such a way", nor the expression, "interpreting the explanation in such and such a way", indicates a ~~finite~~ ^{particular} process ~~which~~ ^{is} accompanying the giving and ~~receiving~~ ^{receiving} of the explanation.

41

There are ~~certainly~~ ^{indeed} what ~~one can~~ ^{would be} called "characteristic experiences" of ~~pointing to~~ ^{pointing to} the shape ~~(in circumstances)~~ ^(e.g. in circumstances). For example, tracing the ~~contour~~ ^{outline} with one's finger, or with one's ~~eyes~~ ^{eyes}, in pointing. - But ~~just as little as~~ ^{just as} this happens in all cases in which I ^{mean} the shape, ~~equally little is it true that~~ ^{doesn't} any other characteristic process ~~occurs~~ ^{occurs} in all these cases. But ~~also~~ ^{even}, if ~~something of the~~ ^{such process} ~~sort~~ ^{did} occur in all of them, it would still depend ^{upon} on the circumstances - i.e. ^{upon} upon what happened before and after the pointing - whether we ~~should say~~ ^{should say}: "He pointed to the shape and not to the colour".

For the ~~words~~ ^{expressions} "pointing to the shape", "meaning the shape" etc. are not used ~~like these~~ ^{like these} as ~~these are~~ ^{these are}: "pointing to the book", "pointing to the letter 'B' and not to the letter 'u'", etc.. - ~~For~~ ^{Just} think ~~only of~~ ^{only of} how differently we learn the use of the ~~words~~ ^{expressions}: "pointing to

to this thing", "pointing to that thing", and on the other hand "pointing to the colour and not to the shape", "meaning the colour", etc., etc..

^{As I have said}
~~As I say~~, in certain cases, particularly in pointing ^xto the shape^x, or ^xto the number^x, there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing^x - "characteristic" because they frequently, (not always) occur where shape or number is ^xmeant^x. But do you also know a characteristic experience for pointing to a ~~figure in a game~~ ^{chessman} ~~as piece in a game~~? - And yet one may say, ^{you}: "I mean this ~~piece~~ ^{chessman} ~~in the game~~ is called 'king', not this particular ~~piece~~ ^{block} of wood ~~that~~ I'm pointing to."

And we do here, what we do in ^{a host of} ~~1000~~ similar cases: ~~Because~~ ^{as} we ~~aren't able to point out some~~ ^{can't mention} ~~one~~ bodily action ^{which} we call "pointing to the shape" (as opposed, e.g., to the colour) we say ^{that} a mental activity corresponds to these words.

Where our language leads us to ^{look for a physical thing,} ~~expect a body,~~ and there isn't a ~~body, there~~ ^{thing, there} we are inclined to ~~say, is a mind,~~ ^{put a spirit,}

43

"What is the relation between names and what they name?" ^{she named} →

Well, what is it? Look at ^{how} language game (4), or ^{at} some other, ^{language game} ~~see~~ ^{that's where you'll} ~~see~~ what this relation consists in. ^{this} ~~this~~ relation may

Among various ~~things~~ things consist ~~in~~ in the fact that hearing the name calls up an image of the thing ~~named~~ in our minds, and

^{sometimes} it consists ~~along other things~~ ~~in~~ in the fact that the name is written on the thing named, or that ~~is~~ ^{the name} ~~is~~ uttered when the thing named is pointed to.

But what ~~is~~ ^{is} the word "this" ^{a (of) the} name in language game (9), or

or ~~the word "that"~~ in the ostensive explanation "this is called..."?
 Well, if you don't want to ~~introduce~~ ^{give rise to produce} confusion it is best not to say that these words name anything. - And, curiously enough, it was once said of the word "this" that it is the real name. Everything else that we call "name" ^{being a name} ~~is so~~ only in an inexact, approximate sense.

This curious view has its origin in a tendency to sublimate - as we might call it - the logic of ~~the~~ language. The proper answer to it is: ~~We~~ call widely different things "names"; the word "name" characterises many different ^{kinds} ~~sorts~~ of uses of ~~a~~ words, related to ~~each~~ ^{each} other in many different ways; - but among these kinds of uses is not that of the word "this".

It is true that we often, ^{s.g.} ~~for instance~~ ^{giving} in an ostensive definition, point to ^a ~~the~~ thing ~~named~~ and in doing so pronounce ^{its} ~~the~~ name. And similarly we pronounce, ^{s.g.} ~~for instance~~ in an ostensive definition, ⁱⁿ the word "this" ~~as we~~ pointing to ^a ~~the~~ thing. And the word "this" and a name ^{can} ~~often~~ ^{stand in the same context} ~~have the same syntax~~: we say "Fetch this", and also "Fetch Paul". # But it is precisely one of the characteristic features of a name that ~~its~~ ^{its} meaning is explained by the demonstrative "This is N" (or "This is called 'N'"). But do we also explain, "This is called 'this'"? or ~~perhaps even~~ ~~"This is called 'this'"~~?

45

This is connected with the ^{idea} ~~view~~ of naming as, ~~so to speak~~, ^{as it were} an occult process. ~~The~~ Naming ^{seems to us like to be} ~~appears as~~ a strange connection ^{between} ~~of~~ a word ^{and an} ~~with the~~ object. -

a word ^{and an} ~~with the~~ object. - And ^a ~~this~~ strange connection ~~does~~ really ^{is made -} ~~take place~~, ~~namely~~ when the philosopher, in order to ^{see} ~~bring out~~ what the ~~connection~~ is between a name and ^a ~~the~~ thing ~~named~~, stares at an object before him, ~~and at the same time~~ repeating a name - or it may be the word "this" - over and over again. For the philosophical problems arise when language ~~ideas~~. And then ^{indeed it's easy to} ~~imagine~~ ~~well enough~~ that naming is some ^{queer} ~~remarkable~~ mental act, ~~as it were~~ a kind of christening of the object. And ~~similarly~~ we may ^{then also} say the word "this" ^(as it were) to the object, ^{addressing} it, a strange use of this word, ^{which I think is never made} ~~which~~ ~~usually~~ ~~occurs~~ ~~only~~ ~~when~~ ~~we~~ ~~are~~ ~~using~~ ~~it~~ ~~in~~ ~~philosophy~~. -

46

~~Why should one wish to register~~
 But ~~what~~ gives people the idea of wanting to make just this word a name, when it so obviously ^{as} ~~isn't~~ a name? - ^{For this very reason} ~~not that~~; for ^{we} ~~they~~ are inclined to ^{raise an} ~~make~~ ~~an~~ objection ^{to} ~~to~~ what is generally called "name"; and ^{so} ~~this~~ objection can be ^{expressed by saying} ~~put in this way~~: that the name really ought to ^{stand for} ~~indicate~~ something simple. And ~~for~~ this ~~can~~ ^{be defended as follows} ~~might give~~ ~~the~~ following reasons: - A proper name in the ordinary sense ^{is} ~~would be~~, ^{e.g.} ~~for instance~~, the word "Nothing" ^(Edcaliber). The sword Nothing consists of ^{various} ~~parts~~ put together in a ^{certain} ~~particular~~ way. If they are ~~not~~ put together ^{in this} ~~in different way~~, ~~then~~ Nothing doesn't exist. Now the sentence "Nothing has a sharp edge" obviously has ^{sense} ~~meaning~~, whether Nothing is still whole or has been smashed ~~to bits~~. Yet if "Nothing" is the name of an object, then this object doesn't exist any more when Nothing has been smashed; and since the name ^{then} ~~wouldn't~~ have ^{no} ~~any~~ object corresponding to it ~~and~~, it ^{hasn't} ~~wouldn't~~ have any meaning. But then in the sentence, "Nothing has a sharp edge", there ^{is} ~~would be~~ a word ^{without a} ~~that has no~~ meaning, and ^{therefore} ~~so~~ ^{"Nothing has a sharp edge"} ~~the sentence~~ would be

would be nonsense. ^{to say} But ~~this sentence~~ does have meaning, and so ^{to} the words of which it consists must always correspond to something.
 Therefore ^{an} in ^{sense} the analysis of the ~~meaning~~ the word "Nothing" must disappear, and ^{instead of it} ~~in its place~~ ^{must appear} ~~must come~~ words ^{which stand for} ~~that name~~ ^{decide} ~~something~~ simple. ^{objects} ~~and~~ These words we may reasonably call the real names.

47

Let us ^{first of all} discuss ~~one~~ ^{this} point of ^{the} ~~this~~ argument ~~first of all: namely~~ that the word has no meaning when nothing corresponds to it. - It is important to ^{note} ~~state~~ that the word "meaning" is used ungrammatically ^{when} ~~if one~~ used ~~it~~ to indicate the thing which ^{'stands for'} ~~corresponds~~ to the word. This ~~amounts~~ ^{is} to confusing the meaning of the name with the bearer of the name. If Paul ^{is dead,} ~~dies,~~ ~~then~~ we say the bearer of the name is dead, but ^{we don't say} ~~no one says~~ the meaning of the name is dead. And it would be nonsensical ^{to} ~~to~~ ^{say such a thing} ~~to speak that way,~~ ^{this,} for if the name ^{had} ~~ceased~~ to have meaning, ~~then~~ it would have no meaning to say, "Paul ^{is dead} ~~has died~~".

48

In (19) we introduced proper names into ^{our} language (II). Now suppose the tool with the name " α " ^{had been} ~~is~~ broken. A doesn't know this, and gives B the sign " α ": has this sign ^{hasn't it} ~~meaning~~ now, or ~~has it none?~~
 What ^{'s} ~~is~~ B supposed to do when he receives this sign? - We have made no agreement about this. You might ask, what will he do? Well, perhaps he will stand ~~there~~ perplexed, or show A the pieces. You might say here: " α " has become meaningless; and this expression would indicate that there is now no further use for the sign " α " in our language game (unless we ~~were to~~ ^{if} give it a new one). " α " ^{may} ~~might~~ also become meaningless ~~through the fact that we,~~ ^{if} for ~~any~~ ^{would} reason ^{or other} ~~whatever,~~ ^{we} scratched ^{mark} ~~a different~~ ~~mark~~ on the tool and ^{no longer} ~~didn't~~ use the sign " α " ~~in the game any more.~~ - But we can also imagine

imagine an agreement according to which, when a tool is broken and A ~~gives~~ ^{shows B} the sign of this tool, B has to shake his head as an answer ~~to him~~. # This ~~gives~~ ^{gives}, we might say, the command "α" a place in the language game, even when ~~this~~ ^{the} tool no longer exists. And ~~we can now~~ ^{we may} say that the sign "α" has meaning even when its bearer ~~has~~ ceased to exist.

49

~~We may - for~~ ^{We may - for} a large class of cases in which the word "meaning" is used # though not for all cases of its use, - explain this word thus: ~~The~~ ^{the} meaning of a word is its use in the language.

And we ~~often~~ ^{sometimes} explain the meaning of a name by pointing to ~~its~~ ^{its} bearer. ~~of it~~.

50

"But, in that game, do ~~names~~ ^{signs (have meaning as)} ~~that~~ have never been used for a tool ~~have meaning as well?~~ ^{too}" Let's suppose that "X" is such a ~~sign~~ ^{sign} and A ~~gives~~ ^{shows} ~~this~~ ^{it} sign to B. - # ~~Such~~ ^{Signs of this sort} ~~signs~~ ^{may also} might be ~~embodied~~ ^{embodied} in ~~our~~ ^{our} language game, and B ~~might~~ ^{might} ~~be~~ ^{expected} ~~supposed~~ ^{to} ~~say~~ ^{to} answer ~~it~~ ^{them} also by shaking his head. One ~~might~~ ^{may e.g.} imagine this ~~as~~ ^{to be} a way ~~the two of them had of amusing themselves.~~ ^{of making their work more pleasant.}

51

We said that the sentence, "Nothing has a sharp edge" ~~x~~ has ~~meaning~~ ^{sense} even ~~if~~ ^{when} Nothing has ~~already~~ been broken to pieces. Now ~~this~~ ^{this} is so because in this language game a name is used in the absence of its bearer. But ~~we~~ ^{we} can imagine a language game with names (~~is~~ ^{that is,} which are used only in the presence of their bearers. Suppose, ~~say,~~ that we were watching a surface ~~on~~ ^{about} which coloured spots ~~were~~ ^{is} moving (as on the screen ~~of~~ ⁱⁿ a cinema). There are three such spots, which slowly change their shapes and positions. Suppose I have named them "P", "Q" and "R" by giving ostensive definitions. Our

Our language describes the changes of these three, and ~~we use~~ ^{we use} ~~say to~~ ^{say to} ~~you~~ sentences like: "Do you see how P is contracting now and is approaching R?". - Now in this language ~~these~~ ^{the} names are ~~removed~~ to be used as synonyms for the demonstrative pronoun "this" ~~together~~ ^{(plus} ~~pointing~~ ^{pointing} to a coloured spot). ~~If~~ ^{There} one of the three spots disappears, ~~then~~ ^{then} I ~~can't~~ say "P has disappeared" - any more than I should say "this has disappeared" - but we ~~say~~ ^{might} ~~rather~~, "the letter 'P' ~~is~~ ^{is} out ~~of use~~".

In this language, ~~you~~ ^{you} ~~say~~ ^{say}, a name loses its meaning if ~~its bearer ceases to exist, and~~ ^{when} ~~there is something~~ ^{there is something} ~~which corresponds to the words~~ ^{which corresponds to the words} "P", "Q" and "R" ~~as long as they have any meaning~~ ^{as long as they have any meaning} - use in the language game - at all. (For in the sentence, "P' ~~is~~ ^{is} out" ~~of use~~, the sign "P'" occurs, but not "P"; and I assume that we do ~~not~~ ^{not} speak about past ~~occurrences~~ ^{events}, ~~or~~ ^{or else use some} ~~have~~ ^{have} other mode of expression ~~for it~~ ^{for them}.) In this language game, then, a name can't cease to have a bearer; only this isn't ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~advantage~~ ^{asset} of the language game; for ~~even when it hasn't a bearer~~ ^{can} a name ~~may~~ ^{can} have a purpose, use, i.e. meaning. ~~(Thus,~~ ^{without having a bearer} ~~the name "Odysseus" has meaning.)~~ ^{(Thus,} ~~And)~~ ^{And)}

52

But ~~this~~ ^{this} language game can, I think, show us a reason why one ~~might wish~~ ^{might wish} ~~to~~ ^{say that} ~~use~~ the demonstrative pronoun ^{is} a name: for the demonstrative "this" can never be without a ~~meaning~~ ^{meaning} bearer. One might say: "So long as there is a this, ~~the~~ ^{the} word 'this' has meaning, no matter whether this is simple or complex." - But ~~the~~ ^{this} ~~fact that~~ ^{fact that} does not make it a name. On the contrary, - for ~~we don't use~~ ^{isn't used with} a demonstrative gesture, but only explained ~~by~~ ^{by} it.

53

~~Now what about this matter of names~~
~~What is the position with regard to whether names really~~

31
really standing for ^{something} ~~what is~~ simple? -

101 E
Socrates (in the Theaetetus):

These primary elements ~~were~~ ^{are} also ~~what~~ Russell's "individuals" ~~were~~, and my "objects" (Tractatus Logico-philosophicus).

54

But what are the simple ^{elements} ~~components~~ of which reality is ^{composed} ~~made~~ up? - What are the simple ^{elements} ~~components~~ of a chair? - The pieces of wood out of which it is put together? Or the molecules? Or the electrons? "Simple" means: not ^{complex} composite. And ~~thus~~ it all depends on: in what sense ^{complex} "composite"? It ~~is senseless~~ ^{makes no sense} to talk about the "simple components of the chair" without qualification. Or: Does ~~the visual image of this tree~~ ^{sense datum} my visual image of ~~this~~ tree, or of this chair, consist of parts? And what are its simple components? Being of different colours is ^a one kind of complexity; another is, ^{e.g.} for instance, the composition of this broken ^{line} ~~contour~~ out of straight bits. Add you ~~might~~ ^{may} call this ~~a~~ curve ~~composed~~ ^{of} of an ascending and a descending ^{branch} ~~part~~.

If I say to someone without further explanation: "What I now see before me is complex", ~~then~~ he will be ^{rightly} ~~quite correct~~ ~~in~~ asking you: "What do you mean by 'complex'? This ~~can~~ ^{may} mean all sorts of things." - The question, "Is what you see complex?", does have meaning if it is already clear what sort of complexity - i.e., what particular ^{kind of} use of this word - ~~is supposed to be in question~~ ^{we are referring to is in question}. If it had been ^{laid down} ~~settled~~, ^{e.g.} for instance, that the visual ^{appearance} ~~image~~ of a tree ^{is to} ~~shall~~ be called complex if you see not only a trunk but also branches, then the question = "Is the visual appearance of this tree simple or complex?" and the question, "What are its simple components?", would have a clear ^{sense, a clear use} ~~sense~~. And the answer to the second question, ^{is} of course, ~~is~~ not: "The branches" (this would be an answer to the grammatical question "What ^{do you call here} ~~does one~~ ~~call~~ 'simple components' ~~here~~?") but ~~rather~~ a description of the ~~individual~~ branches.

55

But isn't ^{say,} a chess board, ~~for instance~~ obviously and without qualification complex? - ~~You are probably~~ ^{I suppose you're} thinking of its being ~~made~~ ^{composed} of 32 white and 32 black squares; # but mightn't you say ~~for~~, e.g., ~~instance also~~ that it is made up of the colours white, black and the pattern of ~~a~~ net of squares? And ^{or} if there are entirely different ways of looking at it, do you still want to say that the chess board is "complex" without qualification? The mistake of asking, outside ^{of} a particular game, "Is this object complex?", is similar to that which a small boy once made who had ~~to~~ ^{to decide} whether the verbs in ~~this~~ ^{such + such} and ~~that~~ ^{were} sentences ~~was~~ used in the active or ⁱⁿ the passive form, and who ~~then~~ ^{pondered the question} reflected whether ~~for instance~~ the verb "to sleep" ^{for instance,} meant something active or something passive.

The word "complex" (and so the ~~word~~ ^{also} "simple") is ~~one that~~ ^{by us,} used in innumerable different ways, connected in various ways with ~~one another~~ ^{each}. (Is the colour of this square ^{of} the chess board simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is the white simple, or is it ^{composed} ~~made up~~ of the colours of the rainbow? - Is this ^{line} ~~stretch~~ of 2 cm simple, or does it consist of two parts ~~stretches~~ of 1 cm each? But why not of a piece ^{of} 3 cm ~~long~~ and a piece of 1 cm added on in a negative sense?)


56

To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of this tree complex, and what are its components?", the right answer is, "That depends ^{upon} what you understand by "complex". (And this, of course, is not answering the question, but rejecting it.)


57

Let us apply the method of ^{No} ~~chapter~~ (3) to the account in the Theaetetus: ~~Let us consider~~ ^{in the context} a language game for which this account, ~~really holds~~ ^{let}. The language ~~then~~ ^{let} serves to describe combinations of

of coloured ^{patches} spots on a surface. The ^{patches} spots are squares and ^{form} ~~make~~ a complex like a chess board. There are red, green, white and black squares. The words of the language are (correspondingly): "r", "g", "w", "b", and a sentence is a ^{row} ~~series~~ of these words. They describe an arrangement of coloured squares in the order



The sentence "r r b g g g r w w" describes then, for instance, an arrangement of this sort:



Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which a complex of elements corresponds. The primary elements are the coloured squares - "but are these simple?" - I ~~can't think of anything~~ ^{don't know} what ~~is~~ ^I could ~~be~~ more naturally ^{the} call "simple", ^{elements} in this language game. In other circumstances, however, I should call a coloured square "complex", ~~is~~ composed, say, of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape. But the concept ~~of~~ "complexity" [?] might ~~also~~ ^{in such a way} be extended ~~so~~ that the smaller surface is said to be "composed" of a larger surface and one subtracted from it. Compare ^{the} ~~the~~ "composition" of forces, ~~the~~ "division" of a line by a point outside it; these expressions show that ^{under} ~~in~~ certain circumstances we are inclined to ^{regard} ~~take~~ the smaller ^{thing} as ~~a~~ ^{the} result of ~~the~~ ^{combining} "composition" of what is larger, ^{things} and the larger ^{thing} as the result of the division of ^a ~~what is~~ smaller ^{thing}.

But I don't know whether I should say that the figure which our sentence describes consists of four elements or of nine. Well, does

does that sentence consist of four letters of of nine? - And what are its elements: the letter types or the letters? And isn't it ^{all the same} ~~quite indifferent~~ which we say, if only we avoid misunderstandings, in the particular case?

58

But what does it mean, that we can't explain (i.e. describe) these elements but only name them? This might mean, ~~say~~, that the description of a complex, if this complex consists ~~of~~ (in a limiting case) of only one ~~element~~ square, is simply the name of the coloured square. // ~~This might mean, say, that when a complex consists, in a limiting case, of only one square, then its description is simply the name of that~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ coloured square.

^{One} ~~We~~ might say ~~here~~ - although this easily leads to all sorts of philosophical superstitions - that a sign "r" or "B" etc., may sometimes be a word and sometimes a sentence. But whether it "is a word or a sentence" depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. If ^{e.g.} A has to describe for B complexes of coloured squares and if he uses ~~here~~ the word "r" ^{by itself} ~~alone~~, ~~then~~ we may say that the word is here a description - a sentence. But if he ^{e.g. is} ~~memorising~~ ~~say~~ the words and ^{that they} ~~their~~ meanings, or if he is teaching ^{someone else} ~~another~~ the use of the words and utters them ^{with the appropriate pointing gesture} ~~in connection with ostensive teaching~~, ~~then~~ we shall not say that they are sentences ~~here~~. In this situation the word "r" ~~for instance~~ is not a description; you are ^{here} ~~on that~~ ~~account~~ naming an element with it: ^{that's why it} ~~it~~ would be strange to say ~~on that~~ ~~account~~ that the element can only be named. Naming and describing, ~~in fact~~, are not on the same level: naming is a preparation for describing. ^{With} ~~When you have~~ naming something ^{we haven't} ~~you have not~~ yet made a move in the language game, - any more than you ~~have~~ made a move in

~~in~~ chess ~~is~~ by ^{putting} ~~setting up~~ ^{on the board} a piece. We may say: with ^{by giving} ~~the~~ ~~naming~~ ~~of~~ a thing ^{a name} ~~nothing~~ ~~has~~ yet been done. It ~~hasn't~~ ~~got~~ a name, — except in the game. This is ~~also~~ what Frege meant by saying that a word has meaning only in ^{the context of} ~~its connection with~~ a sentence.

59

What is meant by saying ~~of~~ ^{the elements} that we can ascribe neither being nor not-being to ~~them~~? — ^{we} ~~one~~ might say ~~something like~~ ~~this~~: If everything that we call being or not-being consists in ~~the~~ ~~fact that~~ connections hold ^{or} ~~do~~ not hold between the elements, then there is no sense in speaking of the being (not-being) of an element; just as, if everything that we call "destroying" consists in ~~the~~ ~~fact that~~ separating ~~of~~ ~~elements~~ ^{apart}, it has no sense to speak of destroying an element.

But ~~we should like~~ ^{we} ~~to~~ say: ~~you~~ can't ^{predicate} ~~ascribe~~ being ^{of} an element, because if it ^{didn't exist} ~~were~~ not, ~~then~~ ^{it} ~~you~~ couldn't even ^{be named} ~~name~~ it, and ^{therefore} ~~so you could say~~ ^{could be said of} ~~nothing about~~ it. — Let's consider an analogous case, ~~though~~ ^{thing} which will make this matter clearer. There is one thing of which you can't say either that it is 1 m long or that it is not 1 m long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. * But ^{of course} ~~by saying this we haven't attributed any curious~~ ~~we have not thereby~~ ~~ascribed~~ any peculiar property to the standard meter, ~~of course~~, but have only indicated its peculiar role in the ~~past procedures~~ ^{of measuring with the meter rule}. * Let's ^{imagine} ~~suppose~~ samples of colours preserved in Paris in ^{the} ~~similar~~ way ^{to} the standard meter. ^{And} ~~and~~ we explain ^{e.g.} that "sepia" means the colour of the standard ~~sepia that is~~ ^{preserved} there in a vacuum. Then it will have no ~~sense~~ sense to say of this sample ~~either~~ that it has this colour or that it hasn't ~~it~~.

it.

This may be expressed thus
~~We may express this in this way:~~ *the* ~~this~~ sample is ~~part~~ *an instrument* of
the language ~~with~~ *by means of* which we make statements about colours. *in this sense* It is,
~~in this game,~~ *the which is* not something described ~~in this game,~~ but a means of description.

* And the same ~~thing~~ *the* holds of an element in *in N^o* language game (57)
when, *assigning a name to it, say* in ~~using~~ ~~it~~, we ~~use~~ the word "R": We have thereby given
this ~~thing~~ *object* a role in our language game, it is now a means of
description. And the statement, *didn't exist* "If it ~~were not~~, ~~then~~ it could have
no name", *now* says as much and as little as: "If this thing didn't
exist, ~~then~~ we couldn't use it in our game." - What, *as might seem* ~~apparently~~
must exist, *is an instrument of* ~~belongs to the~~ language. It ~~plays~~ *is* ~~in our game~~
the role of a paradigm; *the role of a standard with which something's compared.* ~~of that with which a comparison is made.~~

And to state this may be ~~to~~ *make* an important statement. But it
is nevertheless a statement concerning our language *method* ~~in~~ our ~~mode~~ of
describing.

60

In the description of the language game *in N^o* (57) I said that the
~~colours of the squares corresponded~~ words "r", "g" etc., correspond
~~ed~~ to the colours of the squares. But what *is* ~~this~~ ~~correspondence~~
consist in; *in that sense* ~~can~~ can one say that certain colours of the
squares correspond to these signs? *For* The explanation in (57) only
made a connection between these signs and certain words in our *ordinary*
language (the names of colours). * Well, it was assumed that the
use of the signs was taught *differently* ~~otherwise~~ in the *actual* ~~game~~ ~~by~~ by point-
ing to paradigms. Quite; # but what does it mean to say that
in the practice of the language certain elements correspond to the
signs? - Does it consist in this ~~fact~~ *the person* that ~~whoever~~ ~~is~~ describing the
complex of coloured squares always says "r" where there is a red

red square, "b" where there is a black square, etc.? But what if he makes a mistake in his description and ~~says~~ says "r" where there is a black square; what ~~is~~ ^{was} the criterion ^{was for} that shows that this ^{was a} mistake? - Or does ~~the fact that "r" indicates~~ ^{"r" indicating ~~stands for~~ stands for} a red square ^{we are} ~~consist in the fact~~ that ~~the~~ people who use the language always have a red square before their minds when they use the sign "r"?

~~In order~~ To see more clearly we ^{should} ~~look~~ here, as in ^{a great number of} ~~innumerable~~ similar cases, ^{look at what really happens in detail; as it were,} ~~to keep the details of the processes before our eyes, to observe from close at hand what happens.~~ ^{from close by.}

If I am inclined to ~~assume~~ ^{take the view} that a mouse ^{spring} ~~comes into existence~~ by spontaneous generation, ^{from} ~~out of~~ grey ^{rays} ~~scraps~~ and dust, then it will be well to examine these ^{rays} ~~scraps~~ carefully to see how a mouse could ^{have got} ~~conceal~~ itself in them, how it could ~~come~~ there, etc.. If, however, I am convinced that a mouse ~~cannot~~ ^{be generated from} ~~just come into being out of~~ these things, then this examination may be superfluous.

~~But we have yet got to see~~ ^{what it is, however,} that ~~hinders~~ ^{doing} in philosophy ^{makes it so} ~~such an~~ difficult to scrutinize // ^{to see what it is that sets itself against our} ~~examination of the details,~~ ^{is something we have yet to come to} ~~scrutinizing these details,~~ ^{when we are doing philosophy.} ~~understand.~~

61

Now there are various possibilities for ~~the~~ ^{indicating} language game (47), various cases in which we should say a sign ~~names~~ ^{indicates} in the game a square of such and such ~~a~~ colour. We ~~would~~ say this, ^{e.g.} ~~for instance,~~ if we knew that the people who use this language were taught, ^{how to} ~~use~~ the sign in such and such a way. Or if it were laid down in writing, say in the form of a table, that this elements ~~corresponds~~ corresponds to this sign, and if this table were used in teaching

teaching the language and were brought in to decide ~~certain~~ disputed points. - But we ^{can} ~~would~~ imagine also that ^{such} a table ~~of this~~ ^{an} is ~~a regular~~ instrument in the ^{practice} ~~use~~ of the language. The description of a complex takes place ~~in~~ in this way: ^{The person} ~~however~~ describing ^a the complex carries ^{the} table with him, looks up ~~in it~~ each element ^{in it} ~~of the complex~~ and passes in the table from the element to the sign (and the person to whom the description is given may also use a table to translate the words of ^{the description} ~~it~~ into the ^{pictures the} ~~signs~~ of coloured squares.) We might say that ~~this~~ ^{here} table assumes the role ~~here~~ ^{which} is played in other cases by memory and association. (We ~~would~~ not in general ~~carry out~~ ^{an} the order, "Bring me a red flower", by looking up the colour ^{called} 'red' in a colour table and then bringing a flower of the colour ~~that~~ we found in the table; but if ~~it is a question of~~ ^{it is a question of} selecting, or mixing, a particular shade of red, ~~then it does sometimes~~ ^{we do} ~~happen that we~~ make use of a sample or a table.)

If we call such a table the expression of a rule of the language game, ~~then~~ ^{we} can say that what we call a rule of ~~the~~ ^a language game can ~~have~~ ^{play} very different roles in the game.

62 Think ~~only~~ of ~~the~~ ^{sort of} cases ~~in~~ in which we say that a game is played according to a particular rule.

The rule may be an aid to instructing ^{people} in the game. The ^{pupil} ~~person~~ learning is told the rule and is trained ^{to apply it.} ~~in its application.~~ Or it is an ^{implement} ~~instrument~~ of the game itself. Or: ^a rule is used ~~included~~ neither in ^{teaching the game} ~~instruction~~ nor in the game itself; nor is it laid down in a book of rules. You learn the game by watching how others play it. But we say it is played according to such and such rules

rules, ~~because~~ ^{for} a person watching ^{the game} ~~could derive~~ ^{is played} these rules from the ~~practice~~ ^{way} of the game, like ~~the~~ natural laws which the actions of the ~~players obey~~ ^{players obey}. # But how does the observer distinguish, in this case, between a ~~correct~~ mistake on the part of ~~the~~ ^a players and a correct action ~~in the game~~? There are ~~signs~~ ~~characteristic~~ signs for this in the behaviour of the players. Think of the characteristic behaviour of someone who ~~maximizes his utility~~ corrects a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to ~~know that~~ ^{recognise} someone was doing this even if we didn't understand his language.

63

"What the names of ~~the~~ ^a language stand for must be indestructible, for we must be able to describe the ~~condition~~ ^{state of affairs} ~~when~~ ^{that can be destroyed at all} everything ~~destroyable~~ has been destroyed. And in this ~~description~~ ^{of course,} there will be words, and what corresponds to them can't ~~have been~~ ^{mustn't} ~~then be~~ destroyed, ~~since otherwise~~ ^{as} the words would have no meaning." # I must ~~not~~ ^{not} saw off the branch ~~on which~~ I'm sitting on.

Now one might ~~indeed~~ object at once that the description ~~itself~~ ^{at any rate make an exception for itself} must ~~escape~~ ^{that which} destruction. — But ~~what~~ ^{therefore} corresponds to the words of the description and ~~it~~ ^{which} must not be destroyed if ~~it~~ ^{the descriptivity} is true, is ~~that~~ ^{which} gives the words their meaning, without which they would have no meaning. — But this ~~is~~ ^{person} is surely, in one sense, that ~~is~~ ^{is destructible,} which corresponds to his name. But he ~~can be destroyed,~~ and his name does not lose its meaning when ~~the~~ ^{its} bearer is destroyed. — ~~That which~~ ^{That which} corresponds to the name, ~~and is that~~ without which it would have no meaning, is ~~for instance~~ ^(e.g.) a paradigm ~~which~~ ^{which} is used in the language game in ~~connection~~ ^{conjunction} with the name. # ~~That which corresponds to the name and without which it would have no meaning is . . . //~~

64

But what if no such sample ~~belongs to~~ ^{is used in} the language, if ~~for~~

^{e.g.} ~~for instance~~, we remember the colour ~~which~~ a word stands for?

"And if we remember it, ^{that means} ~~it~~ it comes before our mind's eye when we utter the word. The colour ⁱⁿ itself must therefore be indestructible, if it is to be possible for us (at any time to remember it)."

But what do we take ~~it~~ ^{for} as the criterion ~~that we remember it~~ correctly? - If we work with a sample instead of with our memory, ~~we say, on occasion,~~ ^{sample as} that the sample has changed its colour, and we judge this ^{long} by memory. But may ^{we under} ~~it~~ certain circumstances speaking also, of a darkening ^(e.g.) ~~for instance~~ of our memory image? Aren't we just as much at the mercy of memory as we are of a sample? (For someone might ^{wish} ~~want~~ to say: "If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample.") Or, say, of a chemical reaction: ^{imagine} ~~suppose~~ you had to paint a particular colour, its name is "F", and it is the colour which you see when ^{combine} ~~you combine~~ the substance S with the substance T under such and such conditions. ~~Suppose~~ the colour appeared to you one day brighter than on another, ~~wouldn't you~~ then, under certain circumstances, say, "I must be mistaken, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday"? This shows that we do not always ^{regard} ~~trust~~ what memory says as the highest verdict, beyond which there is no appeal.

65

"Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and so the meaning of the word "red" is independent of the existence of a red thing." Certainly it has no sense to say that the colour red (hue, not pigment) has been torn up or pounded to ~~pieces~~ ^{bits}. But don't we say, "the redness vanishes"? And don't cling to the ^{idea} ~~fact~~ ^{reduces} that we can call it before our mind's eye even when nothing

nothing red exists ~~any more~~. This is ^{just} as though you ~~were to~~ said that
~~then~~ there is still always a chemical reaction which produces a red
 flame. ~~// This is no different from wanting to say that ... //~~
^(no longer)
 # For what if you can't remember the colour ~~any longer~~? - If we
 forget which colour it is ~~that~~ ^{which} has this name, then ~~the name~~ loses
 its meaning for us; that ~~is~~ ^{means}, we can no longer play a ~~particular~~ ^{certain}
 language game with it. And the situation is then comparable to that
^{arises from} ~~in~~ which the ~~paradigm~~ ^{sample}, which was an ~~instrument~~ ^{implement} of our language,
 has been lost.

56

"I want to call only that 'name' which cannot stand in the
 connection 'X exists'. - And ~~we~~ ^{thus you} cannot say 'red exists', because
 if there were no red you could not speak about it." More correctly:
 If "X exists" ~~amounts to saying~~ ^{is} "X" has meaning, then it is not
 a sentence about ~~XXX~~ X but a sentence about our ~~use of language~~ ^{usage of words}, ~~viz~~,
~~namely~~ the use of the word "X".

It seems to us as though ~~we were saying~~ ^{I said} something about the
 nature of red ~~in saying that the words "red exists" make no sense~~ ^{do not}
~~It exists~~ ^{- as it were -} "in itself". The same idea - that this is a
 metaphysical statement about red - is expressed ~~in~~ when we say
 that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word
 "indestructible".

But ^{as a matter of fact,} ~~actually~~ we want ~~only~~ ^{regard} to take "red exists" ^{as the} as a state-
 ment: the word "red" has meaning. Or perhaps more correctly: "Red
 does not exist" as "'Red' has no meaning". Only we do ~~not~~ want
 to say that ~~the~~ expression says this, but that ^{this is what} it would have to
 say ~~that~~ if it had a meaning; ~~but~~ that in trying to say this it
 contradicts itself - since red exists "in itself". - Whereas a

might be said to lie
if anywhere,

a contradiction ~~is~~ lies in the fact that
the sentence looks as though it were speaking ^{about} the colour,
~~really~~ when ~~it~~ it is ~~supposed~~ to say something about the use of the word
"red". - ^{In its material fact} ~~in reality~~, however, we ^{do} ~~say very well~~ say ^{that such & such a} ~~a particular~~
colour exists; // In reality, however, it is quite a natural thing
to say that a particular colour exists; // and this ^{means simply}
^{that} ~~something exists~~ that has this colour. And the first expression
is not less exact than the second; especially not ~~in the case~~
where "that which has the colour" is not a physical object.

"A Name only stands for what is an element of reality."

67

"Names stand only for ~~what is an~~ elements of reality. For what
cannot be destroyed, what remains the same throughout all change."

But what is this? - While we were ^{saying} ~~making~~ the sentence ~~it~~
^{already was before} ~~it~~ our minds. We expressed ^{an entirely} ~~very~~ definite idea. A par-
ticular ~~idea~~ ^{picture which we wish} ~~that we want~~ to use. For experience does not show us
these elements. We see ^{parts things made up of parts} ~~appearance of something complex~~ (a chair,
for instance). We say the ^a back is a part of ~~the~~ chair, but ~~...~~
itself made up of various pieces of wood, whereas a foot is a
simple ^{part} ~~component~~. We see also a whole which changes (~~which~~ is
destroyed) while its ^{parts} ~~components~~ remain unchanged. These are the
materials out of which we ^{form} ~~make~~ that picture of reality.

68

^{Now} Suppose I say ~~...~~ "The broom is standing in the corner", is this
really a statement about the broom ^{stick} ~~and~~ the brush? At any
rate, one ^{may} ~~surely~~ substitute for ^{it} ~~this~~ statement one which
describes the position of the broom ^{stick} ~~and~~ the position of the
brush. And ^{surely} ~~this~~ statement is ^{now} ~~surely~~ further analysed, ~~some of~~
~~the first one~~. - But why do I call it "further analysed"? -

analysed"? - Well, if the broom is ^{over} there, ~~that~~ that means
 that the ^{broomstick} ~~handle~~ and the brush must be there and ^{that they} must be in a
^{particular relative} definite position ~~with reference to~~ one another; and this was ^{before}
 as it were, concealed in the meaning of the sentence, ~~before~~ and
 in the analysed ~~form~~ ^{sentence} it is ^{said} expressed. ~~That~~ ^{So} ~~does~~ the person who
 says the broom is standing in the corner ^{means really} that the
^{broomstick} ~~handle~~ and the brush ^{are standing} are there and ^{that broomstick} the ~~handle~~ is sticking in the
 brush? If we ~~were to~~ ask someone whether he meant ~~this~~, he would
 probably say that he just hadn't thought about the ^{broomstick} ~~handle~~ in
 particular or about the brush in particular. And ~~this~~ would be the
 right answer, ^{for} ~~because~~ ^{didn't} he wanted to speak ~~neither~~ about the broom ~~or~~
~~handle~~ or about the brush in particular. Suppose ~~you were to~~
~~say to someone~~ ^{you said to someone} instead of "Bring me the broom", "Bring me the
 broom ^{stick} ~~handle~~ and the brush ^{which} ~~that~~ is attached to it". Isn't the
 answer; ~~to this~~ "Do you want the broom? And why do you ^{put} ~~express~~ it in
~~this~~ ^{queer} in such an absurd way?" // And why take such an absurd way of
 saying so? // ^{So} - Will he understand the ~~more fully~~ analysed sentence
 better, ~~than~~? ^{we} This sentence - ~~one~~ might say - accomplishes the
 same as the ordinary ^{one} sentence, but by a more ^{tortuous} ~~troublesome~~ route. -
 Imagine a language game in which someone ^{is} ~~is~~ given orders to
^{or to move about} ~~fetch~~ ^{objects which are} ~~bring~~ certain things ^{composed of various} up of several parts, ~~or to move them~~
~~about~~, ~~or something of the sort~~. And two methods of playing it:
 in the one a) the complex things (brooms, chairs, tables etc.)
 have names, as in (19); in the other b) only the parts have names
 and the whole is described by ^{means} ~~of~~ them. - ^{in that way} ~~To what extent~~
 is an order ~~in~~ the second game ~~an analysed form of~~ an order in the
^{analysed} first? Is the ~~former~~ ^{contained} in the ~~latter~~ ^{that} and is it ^{brought} ~~abstracted~~

~~out~~ extracted by analysis? ^{the structure of} ~~you take~~ the broom ^{is revealed} ~~to pieces~~
~~you~~ separate the ~~handle from~~ ^{broomstick and} the brush; but does ^{it follow that} the command to
bring the brush consist ~~therefore~~ of corresponding parts?

69

"But surely you won't deny that a particular command in (a) says the same as one in (b). And what ^{would you} ~~are you going to~~ call the second, ~~then~~, if not an analysis ~~is~~ ^{of} the first?" - Certainly, I should also say that a command in (a) has the same meaning as a command in (b); or, as I expressed it ^{before} ~~earlier~~, they accomplish the same. And that means: ^{if someone} ~~if someone~~ shows ~~me~~ a command in (a) and asks "Which command in (b) has the same meaning ~~as this~~?", or ~~asks~~ ^{has the opposite meaning} "Which command in (b) ~~does this one contradict~~?", ~~then~~ I ~~should answer the question in such and such a way~~. But this ~~is~~ ^{does} not ~~mean~~ to say that we have ~~come to an understanding~~ ^{an agreement} about the use of the expression "having the same meaning" or "accomplish the same" in general. ^{// But this is not to say that we now have agreed as to the use of, in general, of the expressions - - - - -} ~~that we have come to a general understanding about the use of the expression~~. ^{may} For one ~~might~~ ask: In what case do we say, "these are only two different forms of the same game"?


70

Suppose that the person to whom the commands ⁱⁿ (a) and ⁱⁿ (b) are given ~~has to look in~~ ^{has to refer to} a table ⁱⁿ which ~~correlates~~ ^{are correlated} names ^{correspond to} pictures before he brings ^{the object} ~~what is demanded~~: does he ~~then~~ do the same thing when ~~he~~ carrying out a command in (a) ^{and} when ~~he~~ carrying out the corresponding command in (b)? - Yes and no. You may say: "the point of the two commands is the same." I should ^{in this case,} say the same ~~here~~. But it is ~~not~~ always clear what ^{be} ~~is~~ to call the "point" of ^a ~~the~~ command. (In the same way one can say of certain things that their purpose ~~is so and so~~ ^{such and such}. What is essential is that ~~this~~ ^{is} is a lamp, that

that it's ~~is~~ used for lighting, — that it decorates the room, fills an empty space, etc., is not essential. But essential and unessential unessential are ~~not~~ always clearly separated.)

EM1

But ~~the expression~~ ^{saying that} "a sentence in (b) is ~~an analysis~~ ^{in an analysed form} form of ~~the~~ in (a)", ^{can} easily mislead us into thinking that ~~this~~ ^{one that} form is the more fundamental; it reveals for the first time what is meant by the other; etc.. We think ~~rather~~ ^{the man} that anyone who ~~possesses~~ ^{knows} only the unanalysed ~~form~~ ^{sentences}, is ~~in want of~~ ^{short} of ~~the~~ ^{an} analysis; ~~but~~ ^{whereas the man} anyone who knows the analysed form ~~thereby~~ ^{got} has everything. — But ~~I~~ ^{can't} say that the latter ~~person~~ ^{misses} loses an aspect of the matter, just as ~~much as~~ the former ~~does~~?

Let's ~~suppose~~ ^{alter} the game ⁱⁿ (57) ~~altered~~ ^{so} that ~~the~~ ^{the} games in it don't stand for squares of a single colour but for rectangles consisting of two such squares. One of these rectangles ~~of the~~ ^{is} , half red, half green, ~~would be~~ ^{is} called "u"; one, half green, half white, "v"; and one, half white, half black, "w". ~~we~~ ^{couldn't} imagine people who had names for such colour-combinations but not for the individual colours? Think of the cases in which we say: "This ~~arrangement~~ ^{combination} of colours (~~e.g.~~ ^{for instance} the tricolour) has a peculiar ~~very special~~ character ^{of its own}".

~~With what right~~ ^{can it be said that} ~~to what extent~~ ^{should we say that} are the signs of this language game ~~in~~ ^{still} need ~~to be analysis~~ ^{of analysis}? In fact, to what extent ~~can~~ ^{this} game ~~(57)~~ ^{be} ~~substituted~~ ^{replaced} ~~for this one?~~ ^{although} — It is ~~in fact~~ ^{the game} a different language game; ~~even~~ though ~~it is~~ related to (57).

Y2

And here we come up against the ~~big~~ ^{lying} question ~~that lies~~ behind all the ~~enquiries~~ ^{we have been making} ~~these considerations:~~ ^{say} for one might ~~object~~ ^{of} to me: "You're taking it easy! You talk ~~about~~ all sorts of language games, but you have

have never said what it is that's ~~is~~ essential to a ~~the~~ language game, and thus ~~is~~ to language. ~~What's~~ ~~is~~ ~~that~~ ~~is~~ ⁱⁿ common to all these procedures ~~that~~ ^{we call} processes ~~and~~ makes ^{them} languages or parts of ^a language. ~~You~~ ^{That means you don't bother about} ~~treat yourself to~~ ^{precisely} that part of the enquiry, ~~therefore~~, which at one time gave you the greatest ^{difficulty} ~~puzzlement~~, ~~namely~~ that concerning the general form of the proposition "and of language."

And ~~this~~ ^{pointing out} is true. - Instead of ~~stating~~ something which is ^{nothing} in common to all that we call language, I say there is no one thing ⁱⁿ to these phenomena ~~on account~~ ^{that makes no} common, ~~in virtue~~ of which we use the same ~~word~~ ^{word} for all of them, - they are ^{akin} ~~related~~ ^{each} to ~~one~~ another in many different ways. And ~~on account~~ ^{because} of this ^{kinship} ~~relationship~~, or these relationships, we call them all "languages". I ^{shall} ~~will~~ try to explain this.

73

Let us consider ^{e.g.} ~~for a moment~~ the processes ^{which} ~~that~~ we call "games" ~~or instance~~. I mean games ^{board-games} played on a board, card games, ball games, ^{athletic prize fighting} contests ~~in the ring~~, etc.. What is ⁱⁿ common to all these? ~~Don't say~~: "there must be something ⁱⁿ common to them, ~~otherwise~~ they would ~~not~~ be called 'games'" ~~but~~ ~~we~~ ~~can~~ see whether something is ⁱⁿ common to ~~all~~ ~~of~~ them. ~~Because~~ ^{For} if you look at them, ~~you will not~~ ^{though} see ^{anything that's} ~~nothing~~ common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections, - a ^{whole lot} ~~long~~ string of them. As I said: don't think, but look. ~~Look~~ ^{e.g.} ~~for instance~~ at ^{board} the games ~~played on a board~~, with ~~and~~ the ~~various~~ ~~connections~~. ^{similarities between them} Now pass to card games; here you ^{will} find many points of ^{similarity} ~~correspondence~~ ^{between this group and} to the first ~~class~~; but many ~~common~~ ~~characteristic~~ features disappear, and new ones appear. If you ~~pass~~ pass to ball games, much that ~~is~~ ^{there was in} common remains, but a ~~lot~~ ^{great deal} is lost. - Are they all ^(entertaining) ~~amusing~~? Compare chess with ~~Knights & Crosses~~. Or is there ^{always} ~~in every~~ case such a thing as winning and losing or

~~a competition~~
~~or rivalry~~ between the players? Think of ~~the games~~ of patience^S.
 In ball games there is winning and losing, but ~~is~~ a child ^{is bouncing} ~~throws~~
~~the~~ ball against ^a ~~the~~ wall and catching it, ^{here is no winning} ~~again~~ this feature has
~~disappeared~~. ^{Look at the} ~~See what~~ part ^{which} skill and luck play. And what a
 difference there is between skill ^(in a game of) chess and skill in
^{Not} ~~a game of~~ tennis. ^{singing & dancing} Think ~~not~~ of ~~board~~ games: here ~~there is~~ the
 element of ^{entertainment} ~~amusement~~, but how many ~~other~~ of these other character-
 istic features have ~~disappeared~~! And ~~we~~ we may go through the
~~many~~ many other groups of games. ^{seeing} ~~watching~~ similarities ^{appear} ~~now~~
~~themselves~~ and disappear.

And ~~not~~ the result of these ^{observations} ~~considerations~~ is: ~~we~~ we see a
 complicated net ^{work} of similarities ~~which~~ ^{ping} overlap and cross ^{ing each} ~~to~~ ~~each~~ other.
 Similarities in ^{the} large ~~aspects~~ and in ^{the} small.

74
 various

I cannot ^{find a better word} ~~characterize~~ these similarities better than by the
~~expression~~ ^{likenesses} word ~~than~~ "family ~~similarities~~"; for ~~this~~ ^{how the} is ~~the way~~ the different
 similarities ^{overlap and cross} ~~overlap and cross~~ ~~one another~~ which hold between the
 members of a family: build, ^{features} ~~facial characteristics~~, colour of
 the eyes, ^{gait} ~~walk~~, temperament, etc. etc.. - And I shall say the
 "games" constitute a family.

up to the

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, ^(e.g.) ~~for instance~~
 constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well,
 perhaps because it has a ~~(direct)~~ ^{to some} kinship ~~with~~ ~~many~~ things which,
^{up to the present been} ~~we~~ have called numbers ~~in the past~~; and thereby, we may say, it
^{gets related} ~~receives~~ ~~an~~ ^{to} ~~indirect~~ ~~connection~~ ~~with~~ other things which we call
 by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, ^{as} we twist
 fibre on fibre ^(in spinning) ~~in spinning~~ spinning a thread. And the strength of
 the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the

through the whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.

But if someone ~~were~~ ~~wished to~~ said: "Then there is something ⁱⁿ common to all these ~~creations~~ ~~merely~~ ^{objects — ~~it~~} the disjunction of all these common ^{properties} ~~features~~", ~~then~~ I should answer: Here you ~~are~~ ^{are just} ~~merely~~ playing with a word. ^{You may} ~~one might~~ just as well say: something runs through the ^{single} ~~entire~~ thread, ~~namely~~ the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

75

"~~Right~~ Right; then for you the concept of number is defined ^{explained} as the logical sum of ~~these~~ ^{these} single, ^{interrelated} ~~related~~ concepts, cardinal number, rational number, real number, etc. ~~and~~ and in the same way, the concept game as the logical sum of ~~the~~ ^{such + such} ~~corresponding~~ ^{sub} ~~concepts~~ concepts." ~~That needs~~ ^{not} ~~to~~ be. For ~~I~~ ^{we can} ~~may~~ give the concept "number" fixed boundaries ~~in this way~~, i.e. use the word "number" ^{as a name} ~~only~~ to stand for a ~~fixed~~ ^{with fixed boundaries, so can} ~~delimited~~ concept, but ~~may~~ also use it in such a way that ~~the~~ ^{its} extension of the concept is ~~not~~ ^{fixed} ~~closed~~ by a boundary. And ~~this~~ ^{how} is ~~the way~~ we ~~in fact~~ use the word "game". ^{in that way} ~~For how~~ is the concept of a 'game' ~~closed~~ ^{circumscribed}? ~~What is still a game and what is~~ ^{When does ~~it~~ ^{something} begin to be a game,} ~~and when does it cease to be one?~~ ^{say where the boundary-lines are?} ~~Can you~~ ~~state~~ ~~the boundaries?~~ No. You can draw ^{some} ~~boundary-lines~~ ^{some}; ~~there~~ ~~aren't~~ ~~any~~ ~~drawn~~ ~~yet~~. (But ~~this~~ ~~has~~ never bothered you, when you ~~have~~ used the word "game".)

"But then ~~surely~~ ~~there~~ ~~are~~ ~~no~~ ~~rules~~ ~~for~~ the use of the word, ^{is not regulated} the 'game' which we play with it ~~has no rules~~.^{is not regulated}" — It is not ~~limited~~ ^{bounded} at every point by rules; but there ~~are~~ ^{aren't any} ~~no~~ rules for how high you may throw ~~the~~ ^{...} ball in tennis, ~~for instance~~, ^{say,} or how hard, yet tennis ^{is} ~~is~~ surely a game and it does have rules.

76

How would you explain to someone ^{one} ~~what~~ what a game is? I imagine you would describe games to him, and you might conclude your

your description with ^{these} ~~all this~~ and the like we call games". And do you know ~~any~~ more yourself? Is it ^{just} ~~perhaps only~~ that you can't ^{explain to} ~~tell~~ the other ^{man} ~~person~~ exactly what a game is? ^{This ~~statement~~ is not} ~~but this is not~~ ^{whoever} ignorance. You don't know the boundaries because none ~~are drawn~~.

As I said, you may ~~draw~~ ^{draw} a boundary for some purpose or other. ^{But is this necessary in order to make it into a useful concept?} Do you thereby make it possible for the first time to use the concept? ^{Not at all} ~~Not in the least~~ - unless ^{you mean, useful} ~~it is~~ for this particular purpose.

Just as ~~the~~ ^{not} ~~unit~~ of length "1 pace" was ~~made useful for~~ ^{given a proper use for} when someone ~~gave the definition~~ ^{when someone} "1 pace = 75 cm". And if you say ~~surely~~ "but before that it wasn't an exact unit of length" ~~I answer~~ ^{I answer}: all right, then it was an ~~inexact~~ ^{inexact} one. ~~Although you haven't~~ ^{Although you haven't} ~~given me~~ ^{given me} ~~a~~ ^a definition of exactness.

77

"But if the concept 'game' is ^{in this way, we bounded} ~~unlimited in this way~~, then you don't really know what you mean by 'game'." - If I give the ~~descriptive~~ ^{plants} description: "The ground was covered with flowers", will you say ~~that~~ ^{that} I don't know what I am talking about ^{as} ~~so~~ long as I can't give a definition of a plant?

Socrates (in ~~the~~ ^{surely}) : "You know it and can speak Greek Hellenic, so you must ~~surely~~ be able to say it." - No. To "know it" does not mean here to be able to say it. ^{here,} ~~This~~ ^{is not} our criterion of knowing ~~here~~.

An explanation of what I mean would be, say, a painted picture and the words ~~that~~ ^{mean} "This is roughly what the ground looked like". But I may say ^{perhaps I say:} ~~that~~ ^{that} "This is exactly what it looked like". - Then were exactly ^{blades of} ~~these~~ grasses and leaves in these positions ~~there~~? No, ~~this~~ ^{should} isn't what it means. And I ~~should~~ not recognise any picture as

as exact ^{one} in this sense.

78

We ~~may~~ ^{might} say the concept "game" is a concept with ~~many~~ ^{blurred} edges. -
 "But is a ~~many~~ ^{blurred} concept a concept at all?" - Is an ~~indistinct~~ ^{blurred} photo-
~~graph~~ a picture of a ~~person~~ ^{man} at all? - In fact, ~~can one always~~ ^{is it always}
^{desirable to} replace an ~~indistinct~~ ^{picture} photograph by a ~~distinct~~ ^{sharp} one ~~to advantage?~~
 Isn't ~~what is~~ ^{an} indistinct ~~often~~ ^{one} just ~~the thing~~ ^{what} we want?

Frege compares the concept ~~with~~ ^{to} a district, and says: a
 district without clear boundaries you ~~could~~ ^{can} not call a district
 at all. This means, ~~no doubt~~ ^{I suppose}, we couldn't do anything with it.
 But is it meaningless to say, "I ~~stand~~ ^{stand} roughly ~~approximately~~ there"? Imagine
^{yourself standing in a street} ~~I were standing~~ with another person in a place and say ~~this~~ ^{roughly} this. In
~~doing so~~ ^{saying it you will} ~~shall not~~ ~~draw~~ ~~any~~ ~~boundary~~, but ~~rather~~ ^{just}
 make ~~say~~ a pointing ~~movement~~ ^{gesture} with my hand, - ~~just~~ ^{exactly} as though I were
 pointing ~~to~~ ^{at} a particular ~~point~~ ^{spot}. And in just this way we ~~may~~ ^{this is how} ex-
^{to someone I say,} plain what a game is. We give ~~examples~~ ^{him} and want them ~~in a certain~~
~~sense~~ ^{in a certain way} to be understood. - But ~~with~~ ^{by} this ~~expression~~ ^{that I say this} I do not mean:
 that he is ~~supposed~~ ^{not} to see what is ~~common~~ ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ ^{to all} these examples, ^{(the common factor being one}
 some reason or other, I ~~could not~~ ^{am} ~~express~~ ^{unable to point out} ~~these examples~~ ^{in a particular way,} ~~in a particular way,~~
 an ~~indirect~~ ^{not} ~~means~~ of explaining, ~~I~~ ^{used for} want of a better one. ^{just as examples can.} For
 an ~~any~~ general explanation can be misunderstood, ~~too~~. - That's ~~just~~ ^{is} how
 we ~~play~~ ^{is played} the game. (I mean the language game with the word "game").

79

Seeing what is ⁱⁿ common: Suppose I show someone ~~various~~ ^a coloured
^{comic} pictures and say, "The colour which you see in all ~~of them~~ ^{these pictures} is called
 'ochre'." - This is an ~~explanation~~ ^{by finding} explanation which ~~the other~~ ^{it} ~~is~~ ^{that's in}
~~person~~ ⁰ understood ~~when he looks and sees~~ ^{look} what is ~~common~~ ^{this} to these
 pictures. He can then ~~see~~ ^{look} at ~~what is~~ ^{element} common, or point to it.

to it.

Compare with this: I show him ^{polygons} ~~rectangles~~ of various shapes, all painted ~~with~~ in the same colour, and say, "What these have in common with one another is called 'ochre'". -


And compare with this: - I show him samples of various shades of blue and say, "The colour which is common to ^{them} all I call 'blue'".

80

If someone explains to me the names of ~~the~~ colours by pointing to samples and saying, "This colour is called 'blue', this 'green', etc.", ^{can be compared} ~~then~~ this case is comparable, in many respects ^{to the case} ~~with that in~~ ^{where} ~~which~~ he gives me a table in which the words ^{stand} ~~are placed~~ under the samples of colours, - although this comparison may be misleading us in various ways. ^{Now we use} # ~~One is inclined now~~ to extend this comparison:

to have understood the explanation means to ^{posses} ~~have in mind~~ a concept ^{in your mind,} of ^{that which} ~~what~~ has been explained, ^{in your mind} ~~and that is~~ (a sample or picture) - If someone shows me various leaves and says, "This is what ~~we~~ ^{is} called 'leaf'", ^{obtain} ~~then~~ I get a concept of 'the ~~form~~ ^{shape} of a leaf', an ^{picture} ~~image~~ of it in my mind. - But what does ^{a picture} ~~the image of a leaf~~ look like ^{doesn't look} ~~like~~ ^{any} ~~no~~ particular shape ^{of leaf} but rather "that which is ^{is} common to all shapes of leaves"? What ^{is the} ~~colour~~ ^{of my mental} ~~sample in my mind~~ of the colour green, ^{i.e.} ~~of~~ that which is common to all shades of green?


"But ^{couldn't} ~~mightn't~~ there be such a 'universal' sample? Say a diagram of a leaf, or a sample of pure green." - Certainly. # But ~~the fact~~ that this diagram is understood as a diagram and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and that ^a ~~the~~ coloured square of pure green is understood as a sample of everything that is greenish and not as a sample ^{of} ~~for~~ pure green: that lies ~~within~~ in the way ~~in~~ which these samples are used, applied.



~~used~~
~~Connected with this is,~~

81

~~this is also where we find~~ the idea that ~~the person who~~ ^{if someone} sees this ~~leaf~~ ^{drawing} as a sample ^{of} for the shape of a leaf in general, he sees it differently from ~~the person~~ ^{someone} who sees it as a sample ~~for~~ ^{of} this particular shape. ^{Well} ~~and~~, that might ~~in fact~~ be so ~~—~~ although (though, in fact, it isn't) ^{and} ~~since~~ it would mean only that experience shows that ~~a person~~ ^{someone} who sees the ~~leaf~~ ^{drawing} in a particular way then ~~uses~~ ^{applies} it in such and such a way, or according to such and such rules.

There is of course such a thing as seeing ^{something} in one way and in another ^{way}, and there are ~~also~~ cases in which ~~the~~ ^a person who sees ~~the~~ ^a sample ^{in this way} ~~will~~ ^{in general,} ~~generally~~ ^{such & such} use it in ~~this~~ ^{a person who} way, and ~~whoever~~ ^{if someone} sees it differently, in a different way. ~~Anyone who~~ ^{he} sees the drawing  as a plane figure consisting of a square and two rhombs, ^{he} will ~~perhaps~~ ^{probably} carry out the command, "Bring me something ^{like this} of that sort", differently from the person who sees the picture ^{as having} ~~in~~ three dimensions ^{spatially}.

82

What does it mean, ^{to} know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge some equivalent of a definition ~~that is not uttered?~~ ^{Such} ~~so~~ that, if it were uttered, I might recognise it as the expression of my knowledge? Is ~~not~~ my knowledge, my concept, of ~~a~~ 'game', expressed entirely in the explanations ~~that I might give?~~ ^{that I could} ~~namely in the fact that I describe~~ ^{in describing} examples of various kinds of games, ~~(show how you can construct all sorts of other games in analogy with these,~~ ⁱⁿ ~~in saying that I should hardly call so and so a game any more; and so forth.~~ ^{showing} ~~in~~ ^{analogous to these in all sorts of ways} ~~such & such, games;~~ ^{such & such, games;} ~~and so forth.~~

83

If someone ~~were to~~ ^{had} draw a sharp boundary, ~~then~~ I could ~~not~~ ^{acknowledge it} ~~recognise this~~ as the one ~~that~~ ^{which} I had ~~also~~ ^{too} always wanted to draw, or ~~had~~ ^{as the one I had} drawn in my mind. For I ~~didn't~~ ^{never} want to draw ~~any~~ ^{one}. We ~~may~~ ^{can} say

in this case :
~~say then that~~ his concept is not the same as mine, but ~~connected with~~ *akin to*
~~it.~~ And the ~~connection~~ *relationship between them* is that of two pictures (of which one consists
of coloured ~~spots~~ *patches* without sharp boundaries, the other ~~out of spots~~ *coloured patches*
similarly shaped and distributed, but ~~with~~ *having* sharp boundaries. The
~~connection is just as undeniable as the difference.~~ *similarity ~~then~~ in this case is*

84

to extend
And, ~~if we take~~ this comparison, ~~still a bit further,~~ then it
is clear that the degree to which the sharp ~~can~~ *can* ~~re~~
~~similar~~ resemble the indistinct one, depends on the degree of
indistinctness ~~in~~ *of* the latter. For suppose you had an indistinct
picture and had to ~~sketch~~ *draw* a "corresponding" sharp picture. In the
~~former~~ *first there* is an ~~indistinct~~ *blurred* red rectangle; you replace it by a sharp one.
Of course - various ~~such~~ sharp rectangles might be drawn ~~which~~ *to* ~~cor~~
responded to the ~~unsharp~~ *blurred* one. But if in the original the
colours ~~run~~ *merge* into one another without ~~any~~ *fa* trace of a boundary, ~~then~~ *isn't it*
~~will it not be~~ *won't* a hopeless task, to draw a sharp picture correspond-
ing to the ~~indistinct~~ *blurred* one? Won't you ~~then~~ have to say: "Here I
might just as well ~~draw~~ draw a circle as a rectangle, or a heart ~~shape~~;
all the colours run into one another ~~just anyhow~~; Everything ~~is~~ *is correct,*
~~nothing's~~ *and* ~~correct.~~" - And this is the position in which ~~anyone~~ *you*
finds ~~himself~~ *yourself, if, e.g.,* ~~who~~ *you* searches for definitions ~~in~~
~~aesthetics~~ *in* or in ethics which correspond to our concepts.

Always ask yourself, in this difficulty: " How did we learn
the meanings of this word - 'god', for instance? By what examples;
in which language games? You will then see more easily that the
word must have a family of meanings.

85

Compare: knowing and saying

Compare: knowing and saying

how many ^{feet} ~~meters~~ high Mont-Blanc is -

how the word "game" is used -

what a clarinet sounds like.

~~The person~~ ^{Anyone} who ~~is~~ ^{wonders} amazed that ~~anyone~~ ^{has it is possible to} can know something and not be able to say it ~~thinks~~ ^{may think possibly} perhaps of a case like the first. Certainly not of ~~one~~ ^{a case} like the third.

86

Consider this example: If someone says: "Moses did not exist", ~~then that can mean~~ ^{this can have} different ~~sorts of things~~ ^{meanings}. It may mean: the Isrealites did ~~not~~ ^{didn't} have one leader when they ~~journeyed out~~ ^{left} of Egypt - or: their leader was not called Moses - or: ~~there~~ ^{never} was ~~anyone~~ ^{that} ~~that~~ ^{that} did all the things that the Bible records of Moses - etc., etc.. ~~According to~~ ⁱⁿ Russell's ~~terminology~~ ^{terminology} we may say: the name "Moses" can be defined by various descriptions. ~~For instance~~ ^{e.g.}, as "the man who led the Isrealites through the desert", "the man who lived at ~~this~~ ^{such & such a} time ~~and~~ ^{such & such a} in ~~this~~ place and was then called 'Moses'", "the man who as a child was taken from the Nile by the daughter of ~~Khafrah~~ Pharaoh", etc.. And ~~according~~ ^{as} we take the one or the other definition the ~~proposition~~ ^{sentence} "Moses existed" gets a different ~~meaning~~ ^{sense}, and similarly ~~with~~ ^{with} every ~~proposition~~ ^{sentence} which treats of Moses. - And if someone ~~says~~ ^{tells} to us: "N did ~~not~~ exist", ~~do~~ ^{really} we ~~also~~ ^{really} ask: "What do you mean? Do you wish to say that , or that , etc. etc. ?"

But if I make a statement about Moses, am I always prepared to substitute any one of these descriptions for "Moses"? I shall say, perhaps, ~~that~~ ^{mean} by "Moses" I ~~understand~~ ^{mean} the man who did what the

the Bible records of Moses, or at any rate ~~a lot~~ ^{much} of it. But how much? Have I ~~come to any decision as to~~ ^{of it} how much ~~must be shown to~~ ^{turn out} be false in order that I should ~~abandon~~ ^{give up} my ~~proposition as false?~~ ^{statement}

^{is my use of} So ~~has~~ the name "Moses" ~~for me~~ ^{there} a fixed and ~~clearly~~ ^{unambiguously} determined ~~use in~~ ^{for} all possible cases? * Isn't it like this, that I have, ~~so to speak,~~ ^{as if were} a whole ~~row~~ ^{lot} of props in readiness, and am prepared to lean on one if another should be ~~withdrawn~~ ^{taken from under me}, and vice versa? * Consider ~~still~~ ^{yet} another case: If I say, "N has died", ~~then~~ the position ~~with~~ ^{as} regards ~~to~~ the meaning of ~~the name~~ "N" may be this: I believe that a person lived whom I (1) ~~have seen~~ ^{saw} in such and such ~~places~~ ^{things}, who (2) looked like this ~~and this~~ (pictures), (3) did such and such ~~and~~ (4) in the social world ~~bears this name~~ ^{had the name} "N". ^I asked what I ~~understand~~ ^{mean} by "N" I should enumerate all ~~this~~ ^{these things}, or some of ~~it~~ ^{them}, and different ~~things~~ ^{ones} on different occasions. My definition of "N" ~~would be,~~ ^{thus} then, say: "the man of whom all this is true". * But suppose ~~something~~ ^{of} it ~~should~~ ^{turned} turn out to be false, ~~should~~ ^{will} I be prepared to declare ~~the pro-~~ ^{shall} position "N has died" false, ~~even if~~ ^{thought} something ~~which~~ ^{seems} ~~seems to~~ quite ~~incidental~~ ^{incidental} ~~had turned~~ ^{had turned} out to be false? But where is the limit of what's ~~is incidental?~~ ^{Had I, in such a case,} - ~~if I had~~ given an explanation of the name in ~~such~~ ^{alter} a case, ~~then~~ ^{would} I should now be prepared to change it.

And ~~we may express this~~ ^{(Can be expressed thus:} by saying: I use the name "N" without ~~any rigid~~ ^{rigid} a settled meaning. (But ~~this~~ ^{no more} impairs its use than ~~it impairs~~ ^{impairs} the use of a table ~~that it stands~~ ^{that it stands} on four legs instead of ~~on~~ ^{on} three ~~though occasionally such a table~~ ^{though occasionally such a table} and so on occasion wobbles.)

Ought ~~one~~ ^{we} to say that I use a word ~~whose~~ ^{the} meaning I don't know and ~~so talk nonsense?~~ ^{thus that I say has no sense} - Say what you like, so long as this doesn't ~~not~~ prevent you from seeing what the situation is. (And if you

you see ~~that~~, ~~then~~ there are ~~a good many~~ ^{some} things you won't say.)

87

I say: "There ^{is} a chair over there"; what if I walk over to it ^{to get} and want to it and want to take it and it suddenly vanishes from my ^{sight} view? - "Then it wasn't a chair, but some illusion or other." - But in a few seconds we see it again and can ^{touch} take hold of it, etc.. - "~~Then~~ ^{So} the chair was there after all and its ^{disappearance} vanishing was some sort of illusion." - But suppose that after a time it disappeared again, ~~#~~ or seemed to disappear. ~~#~~ What ought we to say ~~now~~? Have you ^{got} rules ready for such cases, which say whether ~~one~~ ^{is still to be called} ~~may/call~~ such a thing a "chair"? But ~~are they lost to us in our use~~ ^{do we miss them when we} of the word "chair"; and ought we to say that we really ^{don't} attach ~~any~~ a meaning to this word, ^{as} since we are not provided with rules for all ^{the} possibilities of its application?

88

Ramsey once ~~insisted~~ ^{stressed the point} in a discussion with me, that logic is a "normative science". ^{I can't say} Exactly, what idea he had in mind, ~~I don't know~~; but it was undoubtedly closely ^{related to that} connected with ~~one~~ which ^{I only got hold of} dawned on me later: - ~~namely~~ that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games, ^{or with} ~~calculi~~ ^{having} according to fixed rules, but ~~cannot~~ ^{that we} say that ~~whoever~~ uses language must play such a game. - ^{If, however,} but if you say that our ~~expression~~ of language only approximates to such calculi, ~~then~~ ^{right at} you stand ~~immediately~~ on the edge of a misunderstanding. For ~~this~~ ^{thus it} may ~~make it~~ seem as though in logic we spoke about an ideal language. As though our logic ^{was, so to speak,} ~~were~~ a logic ^{not taking into account vacuum friction + air-resistance} ~~as it were~~, for empty space. Whereas actually logic does ~~not~~ treat of language ~~in~~ ^{of} (or thought) ~~in~~ the sense ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and ~~the most one can say would~~ ^{all} ~~be~~ that we construct ideal languages. But ~~here~~ ^{to use} the word "ideal"

^{here} "ideal" would be misleading; ^{for this would make it appear as though} ~~since it would then appear~~ ^{it suggests} ~~as~~
~~though~~ ^{that} these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday
^{and} language; ^{and} as though a logician were needed to show ^{us, after all} ~~people at last~~
^{this time} what a correct ^{sentence} proposition looks like.

But ^{all this} ~~that~~ can only appear in the correct light when we have
^{reached greater} ~~gained~~ clarity concerning the ideas of understanding, ^{meaning} ~~supposing~~
and thinking. For then it will ^{also} ~~become~~ ^{get} clear what may mis-
lead one ^{has} and ~~did~~ mislead me (Tractatus Logico-philosophicus), ~~→~~
into thinking that whoever utters a sentence and ~~means~~, or under-
stands, it ~~is~~ thereby ^{doing is using} ~~working~~ a calculus according to definite rules.

89

What do I call the "rules" according to which he proceeds?
The hypothesis which describes satisfactorily his use of the words
as we observe it; or the rules ⁱⁿ which he looks up ~~as he is~~ using
the signs, or ^{the rule} which he gives as an answer when we ask him what
his rules ^{is} ~~are~~? But what if ^{our} observation does not show clearly any
rules, and the question doesn't ^{elicit one} ~~bring any to light~~? - For ~~although~~
he ~~did~~ ^{in answer to my question} gave me an explanation when I asked what he ~~understood~~ ^{meant} by
"N", ^{but he} ~~he~~ was prepared to ^{withdraw} ~~retract~~ this explanation and alter it. ~~→~~
^{So how} ~~How then~~ shall I determine ~~what~~ the rules ~~are~~ according to which
he plays? ~~He doesn't know them himself.~~ - Or more correctly: ~~what~~
^{use is there for this as far as left for} ~~is~~ the expression, "rule according to which he plays", ~~supposed~~
~~to mean here?~~

90

Doesn't the analogy of language with a game throw ^{some} ~~any~~ light
here? For we can easily imagine ~~that~~ people ~~might~~ ^{amuse} themselves
^{on a common} in a field by playing with a ball in ~~this way~~ ^{such a way that they} beginning various
~~existing games~~ ^{existing games} (with their rules), ~~leaving a number of them unfinished~~ ^{not finishing some of}
~~unfinished~~, ^{than} in between ^{whiles} throwing the ball ^{up} ~~at random~~ ~~in the air~~,

~~and hitting each~~ chasing ~~one another in fun with the ball, throwing it at one another~~ etc.. - ~~And now someone says that during the whole time these people are playing a ball game and conform to a definite rule with every throw~~ ^{comes if someone said:} ^{: all the} ^{therefore at every point} ~~act according to definite rules.~~

And isn't there also the case in which we play and ~~make up~~ the rules as we go along? And also that in which we alter them ~~as we go along~~.

91

In (75) I said of the ^{usage} ~~application~~ of the word "game" that it is not ~~bounded~~ ^{limited} at every point by rules; but what does a game look like ~~it~~ ^{which} is bounded at every point by rules? ~~These rules let no in~~ ^{The} ^{of Dick Doubt} ~~doubt penetrate, stop all the holes for it?~~ ^{Can't we} ^{imagining} ~~think of~~ a rule which regulates the application of ~~the~~ ^a rules, and a doubt which ~~that~~ rule removes, - and so forth?

But ~~this is not to say~~ ^{doesn't mean} ^{are in} that we doubt ~~because we can~~ imagine a doubt. I can well imagine that someone is always in doubt before he opens the door of his house ^{as to} whether a chasm may not have opened on the other side of it; and that he makes certain ~~about it~~ ^{of it} before he steps through the door (^{one day} and it may ~~someday~~ ^{myself} prove that he was right); but I am not, therefore, in doubt in a similar case. ~~myself.~~

92

A rule ^{stands} ~~is~~ there, like a sign post. Does ~~it~~ ^(the sign post) leave no doubt ^{as to what} about ~~the~~ path I have to take? Does it show in what direction I ~~am~~ ^{have} to go when I have passed it; whether ^{along} ~~by~~ the road, or ^{along the} ~~the~~ field path, or ^{over hedge + ditch} ~~across~~ country? But where does it say in what sense I ^{ought} ~~have~~ to follow it; whether in the direction of the hand or, e.g., in the opposite ~~one~~ ^{direction}? ^{suppose} And ~~in xxxxxx~~ instead of one sign post there ~~were~~ ^{was} a ~~closed~~ chain of sign posts, or chalk marks ^{running up} ~~ran~~ along

along the grounds: is there only ^{was of} one interpretation for them? —
 Therefore ~~can~~ ^{can} I ~~say~~ say the signs-post ~~surely~~ ^{surely} doesn't leave any doubt. Or
~~more correctly~~ rather: it sometimes leaves a doubt, ^{and} sometimes ~~not~~ ^{doesn't}.
 And this is ~~not~~ ^{any longer} a philosophical proposition, ~~any more~~ ^{any more}, but ~~an~~ ^{it's an} experiential proposition.


93

^{imagine} ~~let~~ a language game like ^{that is (4)} ~~to~~ be played with the help of
 a table. The signs which A gives ^{to} B are now written characters;
 B has a table: in the first column are the written characters ~~that~~ ^{that}
 are used in the game, in the second ^{column} pictures of ^{the different} types of buildings
~~stones~~ ^{blocks}. A shows B such a written sign (writes it ^{e.g.,} on a ~~board~~ ^{tablet, slate}, say);
 B ^{finds it} ~~looks it up~~ in the table, ^{looks across} ~~glances~~ at the picture ~~that lies~~ ^{lying}
 opposite, etc.. The table ^{therefore} ~~is thus~~ a rule which he ^{follows} ~~conforms to~~ in
 carrying out the commands. — ~~The~~ Looking up of ^a ~~the~~ picture ~~in this~~
 table ~~is something one's learns by training~~ ^{is} ~~and~~ ^{is} part of this train-
 ing ^{way} ~~consists perhaps~~ in the pupil's learning to ^{draw} ~~travel~~ with his
^{across the table} finger from left to right ~~in the table~~, i.e., in ~~his~~ learning, ~~so~~
^{to draw} ~~to speak~~, to draw a row of horizontal lines.

you might

Sometimes


Suppose now ~~that~~ various ways of reading a table were
 introduced; ^{first} ~~namely~~ ~~as~~ ^{at one time} above, according to ~~this~~ diagram:



~~then again,~~ ^{then again,} another time according to this ~~diagram~~:




or this:



A diagram of this sort is ^{appended} ~~added~~ to the table ^{and is} a rule showing ^{the table} how ~~it~~ is to be used.

~~But~~ Can't we ~~now~~ imagine further rules to explain this ^{rule} ~~one~~? On the other hand, was the first table incomplete without the diagram



And so, are the other (abnormal) tables incomplete without ~~the table~~ ^{their diagrams?} ? ~~And are the others without theirs?~~

94

Suppose I explain: "By 'Moses' I ^{mean} ~~understand~~ the man, if such a ^{one} ~~person~~ existed, who led the Isrealites out of Egypt; whatever ~~he~~ may have been ^{his name} ~~called~~ then and whatever else he may have done or not ~~not~~ ^{have} done". But ^{regarding} the same sort of doubts ^{are} possible ~~regarding~~ the words of this explanation ^{are possible} as ~~there is~~ about the name "Moses" (what do you call "Egypt", whom do you call "the Isrealites", etc.). In fact, these questions ^{wouldn't} ~~don't~~ ^{even if} ~~even~~ come to an end ^{when} we ^{had} ~~have~~ reached words like "red", "dark", "~~all~~". — "But how ^{can} ~~can~~ an explanation help me to ~~an~~ understanding, ~~then~~, if it's ^{never} ~~isn't~~ the ^{ultimate} ~~final~~ one? ^{That means} The explanation is never ^{completed} ~~finished~~, ~~then~~; I still don't understand, and never will, what he means." As though an explanation ^{could} ~~would~~ hang, as it were, in the air unless ^{another} ~~there were~~ ^{it} another to support it. ^{One} ~~Whereas~~ ^{an} explanation may rest on another ^{explanation which has been} ~~that one has given~~, ^{but no explanation} ~~none is in need~~ of another, — unless we need it, in order to avoid a misunderstanding. We may say: an explanation serves to remove a misunderstanding or to prevent ~~one~~, ^{one}, that is, ^{one} which would arise ^{without that} if there were not the explanation; ~~but~~ not, ^{any} ~~every~~ one ^{could} ~~that~~ I ~~can~~ imagine.

It ^{can} ~~may~~ easily appear as though every doubt ^{was just} ~~showed~~ ^{were only a symptom of} an existing ^{well-founded} ~~gap~~ in the foundations; so that a ~~sure~~ understanding is only

only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

95

The sign post is in order, - if, ^{under} ~~in~~ normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose.

If I say to someone, as in (78), ^{stand roughly there}: "Wait ~~approximately~~ here", - ~~can't~~ ^{doesn't} ~~may~~ ^{work} not this explanation ~~serve~~ perfectly? (And ~~can't~~ ^{can't} ~~say~~ not every other ^{explanation} break down too?)

96

"But isn't ^{it an inexact} the explanation ^{after all} ~~inexact~~ surely?" - ~~Yes~~, why shouldn't we ~~not~~ call it "inexact"? ^{But} ~~only~~ let's understand what "inexact" means. For, in the first place, it does ~~not~~ mean "useless", otherwise ^{we should say:} it would mean, ^{such a such a} "inexact for this purpose"; in the second place:

we should call an "exact" ^{explanation's} one. Perhaps that of drawing a chalk ^{line} ~~mark~~ ^{at once} on the place, of marking off a "district". - But ~~then~~ it occurs to us ~~at once~~ ^{chalk} that the line has ~~a~~ ^{thus} breadth; ~~so that~~ a colour boundary would be more exact. But ~~does~~ ^{has} this exactitude ~~still~~ ^{new term} have any function ~~here~~, doesn't it run idle? And we haven't ~~even~~ determined yet what ^{we're to call} ~~is to pass as~~ ^a crossing ~~xxxxxxx~~ this ~~sharp~~ boundary; how, with what instruments, ^{the fact} ~~it~~ is to be established, etc..

We understand what it means ~~to~~ ^{to the exact time} setting a watch ~~exactly~~ to the ~~minute~~, or ~~regulating~~ it so that it runs accurately. But what if someone ~~should~~ ^{ask}: is this exactness an ideal exactness, or how far does it approximate to it? - We ~~may~~ ^{can}, of course, talk ~~about~~ ^{of} ^{time} measurements ~~of time~~ ^{for} in connection with which there is a different ^{exactness}, and, as we should say, ^a ~~greater~~ ^{one} exactness than ~~there is~~ ^{that of a} connection with time measurements by a watch. Where the words "setting ^{the clock} ~~it~~ exactly to the ~~minute~~" ^{exact time} have a different, ^a ~~though~~ related meaning, and the

~~where~~ reading the clock is a different process, etc.. - If now I say to someone: "You ought to come ^{to lunch} more ~~surely~~ punctually ~~to lunch~~; you know ^{we start} ~~that~~ it begins exactly at one o'clock" ^{could you say,} - ~~is it really not~~ ~~there's~~ ^{no question of exactness here at all:} ~~really exactness that is being spoken of here,~~ - because someone ~~may say,~~ "think of how the time is ^{measured} ~~ascertained~~ in a laboratory, or in an observatory, there you see what 'exactness' means?" ?

"Inexact" ^{suggests} - that ~~is~~ really ~~an~~ expression of blame, and "exact" ^{suggests} ~~an~~ expression of praise. And that ^{to say:} ~~means~~ ~~surely:~~ what ~~is~~ inexact does ~~not~~ achieve its aim as completely as what ~~is~~ more exact. So that it ^{all} depends ^{upon} ~~on~~ what we call "the aim". ^{Are we being} ~~is it~~ inexact if we don't tell the joiner the breadth of the table to ~~xxxxxxx~~ ¹ ~~1000~~ of an ^{inch} ~~millimeter~~? And if we don't give the distance of the sun to ^{the nearest foot} ~~the meter~~?

^E ~~and~~ So think ^{how we stretch the use} ~~therefore~~ of ~~the elastic ways~~ of using the words "exact" and "inexact". ^{There isn't} ~~One~~ ideal of exactness ~~is not~~ provided; we don't know what ~~we ought to understand by~~ such a thing? ^{to be like} - unless you ~~yourself~~ stipulate what is to be called ^{"the ideal of exactness"} ~~so~~. But ~~it~~ ^{you} will ~~be~~ ^{find it} difficult for you to ^{make} ~~hit upon~~ such a stipulation; one ^{which} ~~that~~ satisfies you.

97

With these considerations we ~~are at the place where the~~ ^{find ourselves facing the} problem ~~is:~~ ~~to what extent~~ is logic ^{in some way,} ~~something~~ sublime?

For it seemed as though a special depth - ^a ~~universal~~ ~~significan~~ significance - belonged to logic. As though ^{logic} ~~it~~ lay, ~~so to speak,~~ at the foundation of all sciences. - For ^{the} ~~logical~~ ^{investigation} ~~meditations~~ ~~searches~~ ^{investigates} into the essence of all things. ~~It~~ ^{logic} wants to get at the root of things, and ought not to ^{trouble} ~~bother~~ about whether ~~the~~ ^{things} actually ~~happen~~ ~~is~~ this ~~way~~ or that. - ^{the logical} ~~it~~ ^{investigation does not} ~~arise~~ ~~from~~ an interest in the facts of nature ~~events,~~ nor from the ^{urg} ~~need~~ ^{to understand} ~~of~~ grasping causal connections.

connections. ^{But} ~~it~~ springs rather from ^{our trying} ~~the~~ effort to understand ^{at least} ~~the~~ ^{all that's super-sensual} ~~essence~~, or essence, of ^{Not however} ~~everything~~ empirical. ~~Now as though we were~~
^{in order to do this we should search for new facts}
~~to hunt out new facts~~ to this end: on the contrary, it is essential
to our enquiry that we don't want ^{to learn anything new} ~~to learn anything new~~ in it. We
want to understand something which ^{already there before our eyes} ~~lies open to the view~~; ^{it's this} ~~for that~~
~~is that we see~~, in some sense, ^{we don't seem} ~~not~~ to understand.

Augustine (Conf. XI/14): "quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio." - Dies ~~hätte-man-nich~~
You could not say this of a question in natural science (e.g.: how great is the specific ~~weight~~ gravity of hydrogen).

^{That which} ~~what~~ we know when ^{no one} ~~one~~ asks us, but ^{no longer} ~~don't~~ know when we have to
explain it, is something ~~which~~ we have to recollect ^{call to our mind} ~~solve~~.
(And, obviously, something which, for some reason or other, it is
difficult to ^{call to our mind} ~~recollect~~.)

98

It is as though we had to ^{see} look through the phenomena: our
enquiry, however, ^{is not one into} ~~is directed not upon~~ the phenomena, but ~~rather,~~ ^{into}
as we might say, ^{to say, we call to our mind} ~~upon~~ the "possibilities" of phenomena. ~~We~~
~~recollect,~~ ^{that is,} the kind of statements ~~that~~ we make about ~~the~~
phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements
~~which one makes~~ about the duration of events, about ^{events} ~~their~~ past, ^{facts}
present or future. (These, ^{statements} of course, are not philosophical
statements about time, past, present and future.)

Our ~~view~~ ^{investigation} is ~~the~~ a grammatical one. And ~~this view~~ ^{investigation} brings
light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Mis-
understandings, ~~namely,~~ ^{different} ~~which~~ concern: the use of ~~the~~ words of our
language, ~~and which are~~ brought about by analogies ^{can be removed} ~~(which hold)~~
between ~~our~~ forms of expression. ~~And one can remove~~ these
misunderstandings by replacing ~~the~~ certain forms of expression by

This may be called by others. We may call this "analysing" our forms of expression, ^{for} since the procedure sometimes ~~bears a resemblance~~ to ~~taking some-thing to pieces~~ *that of an analysis.*

~~This if way~~ ^{to} may now seem, ~~however~~, as though there ~~were~~ something like an ultimate analysis of our forms of ^{linguistic expression} ~~being~~ ^{therefore} one completely analysed ^{state of these expressions} ~~form of the expression~~. That is: ^{it may seem} as though our usual forms of expression were, essentially, ~~still~~ unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light: // ~~which has to be brought out into the light.~~ // ^{if} ~~once~~ this ^{were} ~~has been~~ done, ^{language would be} ~~the expression~~ ^{clarified} completely ~~explained~~ and our problem ~~is~~ solved.

This can be put as follows:

We may put it ~~also~~ in this way: ~~We~~ remove misunderstandings by making our expression more ~~exact~~: ^{thus} ~~but~~ it may seem as though we were trying to reach one particular state, ~~that~~ of perfect exactness; ^{and} as though ~~this~~ ^{what's} were the real aim of our ~~inquiry~~, ^{investigation.}

100

This is ^{what's} expressed in the question as to the ^{nature} ~~essence~~ of language, of ^a ~~the~~ proposition, of thinking. - For ~~if we try~~ ^{although} in our ^{investigations we are trying} ~~inquiries also~~ to understand the essence of language ^{nature} (its function, its ~~construction~~) ^{structure} // still it isn't that which ~~the~~ question has in view. For ~~it~~ ^{this question does not} see the essence ^{as} ~~set in~~ something ^{which} ~~that is~~ already ^{lies} open ^{before us} ~~to view~~, and which by ^{a process of ordering} ~~being put in order~~ becomes ^{transparent - means} ~~visible at a~~ ^{capable of being all seen at a glance:} ~~glance~~. But rather, something which lies ^{under} ~~beneath~~ the surface, ^{into} ~~something~~ which lies within, which we see when we look ~~through~~ the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

101

^{The essence is what's hidden; natural} "The essence is hidden ^{to us} ~~from us~~": ~~this~~ is the form ~~which~~ our problem ~~takes~~ ^{now}. We ask: "What is language?", "What is ^a ~~the~~ proposition?". And the answer to these questions is ^{to be} ~~given~~ once and

and for all, and independent of all future experience.

102 One person might say, "a proposition, ~~that's~~ the most every-day thing in the world"; and another ~~person~~: "a proposition's ~~that's~~ something very ~~extraordinary~~!!" — And this latter ~~person~~ can't ~~simply~~ look ~~at~~ how propositions ~~function~~, because ~~the forms of our modes~~ of expressions concerning propositions and thinking ~~stand~~ in his way.

103 Why ~~do~~ we say ~~a~~ proposition is something ~~extraordinary~~? On the one hand because of the immense ~~importance~~ ~~that falls to~~ ~~propositions have so far its~~ ~~is~~. (And ~~this~~ ~~is~~ correct.) On the other hand this ~~importance~~, ~~and~~ together with misunderstandings ~~of~~ the logic of language, mislead us into thinking ~~the~~ proposition must perform ~~something~~ very extraordinary, in fact, unique. * ~~Because of~~ ~~a~~ misunderstanding ~~it appears to us that~~ ~~it seems to us~~ as though the proposition ~~does~~ something strange.

104 (The proposition, ~~an extraordinary thing!~~ ~~is~~ already ~~we~~ contains ~~in germ~~ ~~the~~ sublimation of the whole ~~presentation~~. The tendency to assume a pure ~~intermediate~~ ~~entity~~ between the proposition ~~sign~~ and the facts, ~~or even to want to purify, sublimate, the propositional sign itself.~~ — For that ~~it is a question involving~~ ordinary ~~things~~ ~~is~~ something we are prevented from seeing ~~in~~ ~~various~~ ~~ways~~ ~~by~~ our forms of expression, which send us chasing after ~~chimeras~~. ~~forms of expression prevent us from seeing, by sending us off — chasing — —~~

105 Or: "Thinking must be something unique." If we say (mean) that such and such is the case, then ~~we don't stop in what we mean~~ anywhere short of the fact; but ~~we~~ mean that ~~this~~ ~~and~~ ~~that~~ ~~is~~ ~~so~~ ~~and~~ ~~so~~. — But ~~we may also express this paradox~~ (which has the form ~~actually of a self evident statement~~) in this way: ~~You can think~~

think what is not the case.

106

The particular delusion^{we} here refer~~red~~ to is joined by others from various sides. Thinking, language, now seems to us~~z~~ the unique correlate, picture, of the world. The concepts: proposition, language, ~~thinking~~, world, stand one after another (in a row), ~~each~~ all equivalent to ~~the~~ others. (But where ^{is the use of} these words ~~to be used~~ for now? ^{No} ~~The~~ language game ~~to be played with them is wanting.~~)

107

Thinking is surrounded ^{by} a ~~circle~~ ^{ambiguous} nature. - Its essence, ~~logic~~ ^{describes} presents an order, ~~the~~ the order a priori of the world, i.e. the order of the possibilities which ~~must be common to the world and~~ ^{thought must have in common} that to thinking. But it seems ~~as if~~ this order must be extremely simple. It ~~must be~~ ^{is} prior to all experience, ~~must run through the~~ ^{and} ~~whole of~~ ^{all} experience, no empirical ~~muddiness~~ ^{disunity} or uncertainty ~~may~~ ^{must} ~~stick~~ ^{adhere} to it. -- Rather it must be of the purest crystal. This crystal, however, does ~~not~~ appear as an abstraction, ~~but~~ but as something concrete, in fact as the most concrete, as it were the hardest, ~~thing~~ ^{thing} there is.

108

We are under the delusion that ~~what~~ ^{that which distinctive} is ~~special~~, profound, ~~what is~~ essential to us in our ~~inquiry~~ ^{investigation} lies in the fact that ~~it~~ ^{our investigation} tries to grasp the ~~ungraspable~~ ^{incomparable nature} essence of language. That is, the order which holds between the concepts: proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, etc.. This order is a ~~super-order between~~ ^{order between} ~~to speak~~ ^{it were} - ~~super-concepts~~ ^{super-concepts}. (Whereas ^{in fact} the words "language", "experience", "world", if they have an application must have one just as humble as the words "table", "lamp" and "door".)

109

On the one hand it is clear that every proposition of our language "is in order just as it is". That is, that we don't

arent ~~trying to reach~~
 don't ~~strive after~~ an ideal. As though our ordinary, vague pro-
 positions didn't ^{yet} have ~~any~~ meaning ~~yet~~ and we had ~~yet~~ ^{still} to show what
 a correct proposition looks like. On the other hand it seems clear
 that where there is meaning there must be perfect order. ~~So that~~ ^{Therefore,}
~~the~~ perfect order must be even in the vaguest proposition.

"The meaning of ~~the~~ ^a proposition - we ~~should like~~ ^{are inclined} to say - can
 certainly leave this or that open, but the proposition must ~~surely~~
 have one definite meaning." Or: "An "indefinite meaning", ~~that~~
 would really be no meaning." ~~This~~ ^{is} like saying: "A boundary ~~that~~ ^{which}
 is ~~not~~ sharp, ~~that~~ ^{is} really no boundary at all". ~~The~~ line of
 thought ~~here~~ ^{something like} is roughly this: ~~If I say,~~ ^{we} "I locked ~~the~~ ^{him} man up ~~well~~ ^{scarcely}
 in the room - only one door ~~remained~~ ^{was left} open", then in fact I haven't
 locked him ~~in~~ ^{at all}; ~~he~~ ^{there was only a pretence} only gives the illusion of being locked
~~in~~. ~~One~~ ^{We should} would be inclined to say here: "so you ~~didn't~~ ^{nothing's} do anything
 at all". And yet ~~he~~ ^{had been} did do something. (A boundary ~~that~~ ^{which} has a
 gap - ~~one~~ ^{we'd} would ~~like~~ to say - is as good as none at all. But is
~~this~~ really true?)

Consider also this proposition: "The rules of a game can
 certainly ~~leave~~ ^{allow} a certain freedom, but they must ~~still~~ ^{nevertheless} be quite
 definite rules." That ~~'s~~ ^{said} as though you ~~were~~ to say: "By means of
 four walls you can ~~and~~ indeed leave a person a certain freedom of
 movement, but the walls must be perfectly rigid" - and ~~this~~ ^{is} is ~~not~~
 true. If, ~~however~~ ^{on the other hand}, you say: "the walls may, ~~no~~ ^{of course} doubt, be elastic, but
 then they have ~~a~~ ^{one} quite definite elasticity" - what does ~~this~~ say?
~~further~~ It seems to say that you ~~would~~ ^{must} have to be able to state
 this elasticity; but ~~this~~ again is not true. "The thing ~~always~~ ^{has}
one definite length - whether I know it or not": ~~that~~ ^{by this we really} is really

~~we declare~~ ^{that we attach ourselves to}
 really ~~is~~ ^{an avowal of} a particular form of expression. ~~That~~ ^{That form of}
~~expression~~ ^{made use of} which ~~makes~~ ^{uses} ~~is~~ ^{the} form of an 'ideal of exactness' - ~~to~~ ^{to} speak
 as a parameter of the description.

110

^{Such a declaration in favour of a particular form}
~~is~~ ^{an avowal of} a form of expression, if it ~~is~~ ^{is} expressed in the
~~guise of a proposition~~ ^{statement about the} ~~that treats of~~ ^{concerned} objects (rather than ~~of~~ ^{about}
 signs) must be "a priori". For its opposite ~~becomes~~ ^{becomes} really unthinkable,
~~insofar as there~~ ^{as} corresponds to it a form of thought, a form of ex-
 pression, which we have excluded.

111

"It ~~surely~~ isn't a game if there is a vagueness in the rules."
 - But ~~it~~ ^{well} isn't it ~~then~~ a game? - "Yes, perhaps you ~~will~~ ^{will} call it
 a game, but anyway it isn't a perfect game." That ~~is~~ ^{is then impure} ~~is~~ ^{has then}
~~lost its purity~~ ^{adulterated impurities}, and I am interested in ~~that~~ ^{the pure article} which has lost its
 purity. ~~But I want to say~~ ^{But what I wish is: we} you misunderstand the rôle which the ideal
 plays in your ~~mode~~ ^{language} of expression. ~~That is, too,~~ ^{That is, too,} you would call it a game;
 too, that is to say, only you're ~~blinded~~ ^{dazzled} by the ideal and ~~so~~ ^{therefore} you
 don't see clearly the real application of the word "game". (It would
 be similar if you were to say // It is as though you were ~~to say~~ ^{said} //
~~"The area of this wheel is really $d\pi^2$ "~~ ^{perimeter circumference} ~~it has been made~~ ^{that} exactly.)

112

~~There can't be~~ ^{we wish} a vagueness in logic - we ~~want~~ ^{wish} to say. ~~is something that~~ ^{is something that}
~~can't be~~. We live now in the idea: the ideal "must" be ~~there~~ ^{lie in reality} in
 the real world ~~reality~~. - While we don't yet see ~~how it~~ ^{lies in it} is there // ~~now it has a~~
~~place there~~ //, and don't understand the nature of this "must".
 We believe ~~it~~ ^{lie} must ~~be~~ ^{believe to see it} in the real world, for we think we already
 see it there.

In our thoughts The ideal sits ~~firm~~ ^{we got} and immovable. You can't
 step out ~~of~~ ^{outside} it. You ~~always~~ ^{you can't breathe} have to go back ~~again~~ ^{How does this queer situation arise?}. There is no
 outside; outside ~~there's no air~~. - Whence this? The idea, ~~rests~~ ^{rests} as

as it were, ^{sits like} on our nose ~~as~~ a pair of spectacles, and whatever we look at we see through ~~it~~ ^{them}. It never enters our head to take them off.

How can I understand the ~~proposition~~ ^{sentence} now, ~~the~~ ^{when} the analysis is ~~supposed~~ to be able to show ~~what~~ ^{it is} I really understand? - Here the idea of understanding as a ~~peculiar~~ ^{strange} mental process enters in.

The strict, ~~clear~~ ^{...} rules of the logical construction of ~~the~~ ^a proposition appear to us as something in the back ground, - ~~embedded~~ ^{indged} in the medium of understanding. I ~~see~~ ^{hidden} them now already (even though through a medium) I see them even now (although through a medium) ~~x~~ since I understand the sign, mean something ^{by} with it. The ideally ~~rigid~~ ^{rigorous} construction appears to me as something concrete: - I had used a simile; ~~because~~ but because of the grammatical illusion, that to the ~~concept word~~ ^{general name} there corresponds one thing, ~~that which~~ ^{is} common to all ~~the~~ ^{the} objects, it ~~did~~ ^{telling under it} not seem to be a simile.

113

We now have a theory (a "dynamical" theory of the proposition, etc.) but it does not ~~seem~~ ^{appear} like a theory. ~~It is~~ ^{For} a characteristic of ~~this sort of~~ ^{such a} theory that it ~~examines~~ ^{looks at} a ~~special~~ ^{particular}, clearly ~~visible~~ ^{illuminating}

^{illustrative} case and says: "This shows the way it always is; this case is the prototype of all cases." - "Of course, ~~it must be like that~~ ^{that's how it must be}", we say, and are satisfied. We have ~~hit~~ ^{found} ~~come upon~~ a form of ~~description~~ ^{presentation} that ~~is~~ ^{which} evident to us. But it is as though we ~~had~~ ^{saw} now ~~seen~~ something which lies beneath the surface. ~~//which lies under the surface//~~

^{attract} Now this tendency to generalize the clear case seems in logic to ~~have its~~ ^{be} strictly ~~justified~~ ^{justified}: here ~~we~~ ^{for once} seem to be fully justified in concluding: " I f one proposition is a picture, ~~then~~ ^{how the same} every proposition must be a picture, for they must all be of the same ^{nature} ~~in~~ ^{nature} essence." For we are under the delusion that what is

what is sublime, ~~what is essential~~ ^{about} ~~in our inquiry~~ ^{investigation, it's essential features} ~~consists in this~~
~~lies in this fact~~ that it grasps one all comprehending ~~essence~~ ^{entity}.

114

But ~~we~~ ^{then} believe ~~we~~ ^{that} must find that order, the ideal, in ~~the~~
actual language we easily ~~reach the stage of~~ ^{get to} speaking of a
"real" sign, of ~~searching for the real sign,~~ ^{scrutinizing looking} ~~behind what is~~ ^{which}
ordinarily called "the sign": ~~behind that, namely, which is ordinari~~
~~ordinarily called "the sign".~~ ~~//~~ ~~For we now long for something pure.~~ ^{feel the need} ~~The~~ ^{more}
~~meaning~~ ^{idea} (the ~~essence~~ ^{nature}) of our ~~study~~ ^{enquiry here asks for purer objects.} requires ~~here something purer~~
~~of~~ ^{are about} which the strict rules ~~treat~~. The totality of these rules - ~~we~~
~~imagine - is to~~ constitute ^{symbol} the complete grammar of the sign. The pro-
position, the word, of which logic treats must be something pure
and sharp-cut. We now rack our brains about the essence of the
sign. - ~~in fact,~~ ^{Mustn't} it be the ~~idea~~ ^{image} of the word; ~~in fact,~~ ^{or even,} the
idea at the present moment?

115

Here it's ~~difficult~~ ^{as it were} ~~to speak to keep~~ ^{the head above the water} ~~one's head up,~~ - to
see that we must ~~keep~~ ^{stick} to the ~~things~~ ^{objects} of every day thinking, and not
to get on the wrong track where it seems as though we had to
describe the ~~ultimate refinements,~~ ^{last illusive details} which ~~on the other hand~~ ^{again, it refuses} we can't
describe ~~at all~~ with our means. It is as though we had to restore
a ruined ~~spire~~ spider web with our fingers.

116

(In these reflections also what is problematic doesn't
come from the fact that we haven't yet ^{got to the bottom of} reached the reason of the
appearances; but rather from the fact that we don't know our way
about in the grammar of our mode of expression, the signs, with
reference to physical objects.)

But the more accurately we observe actual language, the
sharper becomes ^{antagonism} the conflict between it and our demand. (The