Sheet 4

(52)

Manuscript Notebook
in English, on the
topic of "privac
apparently these ar
notes for a lecture
Date unknown

Oxford

REDI-2

Wittgenstein 166

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THE
"CANVAS"
SERIES

NO.	INCHES	M/M	PAGES
00	$5\frac{7}{8}$ x $3\frac{1}{4}$	149 x 83	120
0	$6\frac{3}{8}$ x 4	162 x 102	96
1	7 x $4\frac{1}{2}$	178 x 115	144
2	8 x 5	203 x 127	200
3	8 x $6\frac{1}{2}$	203 x 165	240
4	9 x 7	229 x 178	300
5	10 x 8	254 x 203	300
10	$12\frac{3}{4}$ x 8	324 x 203	100
20	$12\frac{3}{4}$ x 8	324 x 203	200
30	$12\frac{3}{4}$ x 8	324 x 203	300

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Item 52

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Notes for the 'Philosophical Lecture'.

Privacy of experience. This privacy a superst.. Something like privacy. What seems (characteristic) to be the essential of pr.? Nobody but I can see it, feel it, hear it; nobody except myself knows what it's like. Nobody except I can get at it.

Language game with the colour-chart. Let us imagine each man has a private chart (perhaps besides having a public one). Imagine he points to green on his pr. ch. when 'red' is said. Why should we say he means by 'red' the colour we mean by 'green'?

Privacy of feelings can mean: nobody can know them unless I show them; or: I can't really show them. Or: if I don't want to, I needn't give any sign of my feeling but even if I want to I can only show a sign of that the feeling.

Meaning consisting of the word referring to an object.

How an ~~idea~~ idea of object is hypostatized for a technique of use. This word refers

to this object that word to that object. Explanation of the object referred to not by pointing but by explaining a technique. Colour words shape-words, etc.

Under what circumstances pointing can explain i.e. convey the use of a word NOT to a baby. It learns by being trained. There is therefore no occult act of naming an object that in itself can give a word a meaning.

Words for coloured shape
Words for colour on

one side of a line.
What does 'now' refer to or 'this' or 'I'?
The private object.
The naming of the private object. The private language.
The game someone plays with himself. Why do we call it a game?
If it resembles a public game. The diary of Robinson Cr.
So we must first think that we understand the working of a word in lang. If we say it is a name which we give to some sort of experience which we have. The thesis

here: we have some.
Why it is as if
were before the mind's
eye (or some other sense)
& we give it a name.
What could be simpler?
(could put it roughly this way:)
One way of ostensive definition ex-
plains the use of a
word only when it
makes one last deter-
mination, removes one
last indeterminacy.
The relation between
name & object. Lang-
guage of children.
What is the relation
between names & actions
names & shapes? The
relation of ostensible

defining. That is to say, in order to establish a name relation we have to establish a technical use. And we are misled if we think that it is a peculiar process of christening a thing which makes a word the word for an object. This is a kind of superstition. So it is misleading to say that we have a private object before our mind & give it a name. There is a name only where there is

a technique of sewing
& that technique
can be private;
but this fully means
that nobody knows
& cares about it &
therefore in such
can have a private
sewing machine. But
in order to be a
private sewing machine
it must be an object
~~which~~ deserves the
~~[illegible]~~ name sewing
machine not in virtue
of its privacy but
in virtue of its similarity to sewing ma-
chines private or
otherwise.

Now shall we say:
My pains are my
private property.
Because only I
am directly aware
of my pain. But
what does that
mean? I suppose
to be aware of
pain means to feel
it + not it's my
pain because I
feel it. For what does
it mean to say only
I feel my pain.
We have so far not
given any sense to
the phrase I feel
his pain (except
in the sense I feel

the same Bond (pag
or perhaps I binding
indeed the two pair)
+ therefore no use
to that phrase I feel
my pain either. (I
don't say that we
couldn't arrange for
a sense for these
phrases.) We could
of course use the
proviso "A person is
directly aware of
his pain only + indirectly aware of
the other man's"
a determining rule to the effect
that if > 5 ft
N " N, " directly

aware of pain" this
means, (N has pain
whereas (N is indif. aware
of pain" to mean:
N is aware of the
fact that I would
felge this pain.
(And this illustrates
to call the healthy
use of these phrases)
Here too the
the expression "direct
they are & such are
ale extremely misleading.
What gives us the
idea that the
person who feels pain
& wants to be free,
sees it object,
whereas we are only

sold that it there but can't see it? It is the peculiar tense form of the verbs like feeling, seeing etc. But before explaining what I mean I must make a preliminary remark. For I fear that some will think this is the worst kind of verbalism. I shall make a general remark about grammar & reality. Roughly speaking the relation of the grammar ~~to reality~~ ~~it that~~ of expression to the facts which

they are used to
describe it. It that
between the descrip-
tion of methods & units
of measurement & the
measures of objects
measured by those
methods & units.
Now I could de-
scribe the shape &
size of this room by
giving its length
breadth & height in feet
& just as well by
giving them in meters
I could also give
them in microns. In
a way therefore you
might say that the
choice of the unity

is arbitrary. But in a more important sense it is not. It has a most important bearing both in the sense in the irregularity of shape of the room which & in the use we make of room that we don't measure its dimensions in ft. or cm in cm. That is to say not only the ~~[illegible]~~ result of measurement but also the description of the method & unit of measurement tells us something about the world

that this verbal expression is the first person used to replace the expression of pain. So that if some people say that 'bodily pain' refers to behaviour we can answer them that 'I have pain' does not refer to pain behaviour but is a pain behaviour. It corresponds to a cry of pain not to the statement I am crying. But merely I do distinguish between my pain behaviour when I just behave

that they have
no pain & then the my pain behaviour
opposite case. If
I mean do I ~~realize~~ recognize
~~admit~~ ~~the~~ the fact that
people sometimes behave
as though they had
pain whereas they have not,
I (~~certainly~~) do. But
I wish to say that
you can't explain
that difference by
saying that if he
has pain there is behind
his ~~expressions~~ behaviour a certain
something present which
he expresses by his
behaviour. If instead
of "a certain something"
or some such phrase

you're bold enough to say 'pain' then the statement becomes tautologous. If you want to avoid the mention of pain because this already presupposes that we know what is behind his expression then it does not help you to say 'a certain feeling' or 'a certain something' for how do you know that you are allowed to call it a feeling or even a something. For the word something has a public meaning

if I mean any
thing at all. And
the if I could
say, my that be
bad something you
might as well say all
mean
you know to my that
the bar pain. The point
is that an amusement alley
object can't justify
the use of a word
neither for the others
nor for him. The private
object does not only
not enter the public
game but it can't
enter a private game
either. You can see
this if you replace
the one private object

which is to justify his
use of a pair expressing
by a verbes of different
objects which he has
at different times
when he says he has
pain. But surely
the use of the word
pain is based on the
fact that he "recog
nises" his toothache
object as always
being the same on
those occasions!"
What is he meaning
this case by being
the same, or "recognis
ing"? neither he nor
we have ever learnt
to apply these words

to his private object.
Fairly instead
of "the recognises
the object" we said
more cautiously "he
believes he recognises"
— but then we ought
to say that he
believes that he
believes he recognises
and so on ad inf.
In other words:
If this object is
a private one, we
wanted to be we
have no reason
to call it one object
rather than 100 objects,
we have no reason
to apply the word

object at all & no more has he.
This poem I think ~~[illegible]~~ is in the least ~~[illegible]~~ as ~~that~~ it ought not to be. It should be designed as a justification. For it consists of a mixture of probabilities & paradoxes & why ~~[illegible]~~ should say them seem pretty unclear.
For to say that he has a private object means that we shall regard no description which he may put of it as really telling us what it is like. We assume

that when he was
taught our language
the process of the
object made it impos-
sible to teach him
the application of
language to this ob-
ject. But what if
he just had guessed
the right application?
But which is the right
application? There
is nothing to guess
at. But could it
be if only by chance
have stumbled on
the ~~analogical~~ appli-
cation analogous to
the public one? But
what are we in this

case to call 'analogous'?

Ru bmf xsvog wgsvik, zg pogby wmug xsvog bmfihopu; + ru bmf wmug xsvog bmfihopu - dsb hsmfpro bmf xsvog gsv wghvik?

In fact the provable object is one about which neither he who has it nor he who hears it can say anything to others or to himself.

But that form always sounds as though you worked

to deny the existence
of pain is opposed to
that I can behave in
that way that would
mean to deny the ex-
tence of pain except
to deny that people
have ever felt pain;
or to deny that it
makes sense to say
that someone has pain.
What I do deny is
that we can construe
the grammar of "ha-
ving pain" by ascribing
to it a private
object. Or: The private
object functions
all right only as long
as its grammar is

entirely
constructed to suit
the grammar of
the common object
in question. & it becomes
an absurdity if its
nature is supposed
to explain that
grammar.

We can express this
as follows: There is
no justification for
an utterance of pain
~~[illegible]~~ in the sense
in which there is for
my saying that some
one else is in pain.
There is no essentially
private justification
for I could not know
whether anybody that I

essentially private
is a justification.
There is something
in front of me
which justifies me
in saying there is
a table in front of
me

As introduction:
Word referring to an object.
Using a word analogous
by to certain cases,
Equality + the criteria
of equality
imagining + making use
of the image.
Recognizing the object
as the same you had
before. But if we use

the words 'recognize' & 'same' he must be justified in saying that he recognizes the object as the same. Can his recognition be infallible? No; for he can go wrong in the use of the word 'same'.

// No, for we may say that he goes wrong in the application of the word 'same'. //

He recognizes; but suppose he went wrong, would it make any difference? But what is it like to be right in this case?

We can't e.g. discuss

the question whether
he is justified to
believe the same
utterance twice,
if we imagine any-
thing that we should
call a justification,
some probable regu-
larity it must be
something which, if
we saw it, we should
call a regularity.
But that would in
our case mean seeing
his probable regularity.
We haven't given it
any sense. That is,
we have indeed
given the expression
to feel what he feels
sense but with

particular criteria for the identity. If we now talk of identity & don't mention these criteria we are left without any unless we give fresh ones. And of course I know perfectly well that we are thinking of criteria similar to the ones of physical objects only we can't apply any such criteria in our case & that's what we mean by talking of the priva cy of the objects. Priva cy here really means the absence of means

of comparison. Only
how which up the
state of affairs where
we are prevented
from comparing the
objects with that
of not having fixed
a method of comparison. And in the
moment we would
fix such a way of
comparing we would
no longer talk of
'sensations'.

But suppose
say: 'I have the
same sensations now
as five minutes ago'
— what criterion
of identity am I

wrong? – What criterion am I using for determining that what I feel is or not what I see red? None. There are criteria which can convince me that I am using the word 'red' or 'red' as they are normally used in English. I can point to some thing & say: 'The colour of this you do call "red", don't you?' etc.

That's to say: I am '(I feel that I felt 5 min. ago)' have no justification analogous to the case-room

for calling the se-
pations identical
~~are~~ apart from my
justification for my
use of the words
employed in other
contexts. And this
means: I can't jus-
tify my saying this
either to others
or to myself. Or rather
it's better to say that
I can justify saying
this in such & such
a sense but not
in one analogous to
..... It is as the
~~the~~ compare games
& say: in this ball
there is nothing corre-
sponding to the net

in Points.

Memory can be compared with a store house only so far as it fulfills the same purpose. Where it doesn't we couldn't say whether the things stored up may not constantly change their nature & so could be said to be stored at all.

But don't we say two sensations are equal when we find them equal & finding them so the justification for saying it? But how do we recognise finding two

sensations equal'?

He learns to use the word, & then, whenever — he says'. ...? What are the circumstances under which he then says ....? Could we say: — & then, whenever he feels pain he says — ? or ... & then, whenever he has a certain feeling he says'? Or: — & then, whenever he has a certain particular he says ....?

But if he is truthful, why shouldn't we

take his word for it that he sees red? But we don't. That's to say we believe that he is not telling us a lie. — But if he is intelligent as well, why should we believe that what he has before ~~our~~ his mind's eye is red. We do, accordingly to the method of comparison applicable in this case.

"Then where do you disagree with us?" — When you talk about something incommunicable, private.

You seem to deny the existence of something;

on the other hand you say you don't deny ~~the~~ any existence: why should it seem as if you did? You seem to say: "There is only ....". You deny "it seems" the background of the expression of sensations. ~~Which~~ Doesn't the expression point to something be yond itself? — If we see the feeling as a background to the ~~f~~ expression then we can always assume that we are wrong in thinking that this background doesn't change; we can

assume that our memory at each st. again cheats us + that we use the expression bona fide to express something different each time. So that one might say: it doesn't matter <u>what</u> is behind the expression so long as it is a bona fide expression of it.

Our answer is: Why do you think that a cry would be the <u>expression</u> of the background if there were one? In what sense would the cry <u>for me</u> point to such

a background?
Aren't you assuming
a <u>language game</u>
which in this case is
not played? You
bring in the idea
of expression &
background because
you lost sight of the
game that's actually
played through
the schema of an
other game.

'A cry <u>with</u> something'
& a cry <u>without</u> something'

The grammar of an
expression can't be in-
vestigated by transforming
the expressions parti-
cularly when they all

more use of the same picture. So have to remind yourself of the use to get out of the rut in which all these expressions tend to keep you.

The whole point of investigating the 'verification' e.g. is to stress the importance of the use as opposed to that of the picture.

In this way we have to <u>investigate</u> the use of 'cry <u>with</u>...' + 'cry without...' although of course there are plenty of pictures ready taken from other uses

of 'with' & 'without'
but the pressure
which comes most rea-
dily in ~~our~~ mind are
just those which
confuse us.

Comparing measuring
rods with measuring
lengths. To get rid of
the confusing picture
reminding ourselves exac-
tly how we measure time.
The difficulty here
is that those pre-
tures are terribly
insistent forcing us
to see everything in
their light.

Words with & without
sense.

The application of a word (say 'with') compares this case with other cases. But we're just questioning how far this comparison holds. So we must remind ourselves of cases which these words don't suffect.

"But surely I know what pain is & that I always have just what the I says have pain I". Second it strike you as odd that you should know so well what pain is, now when you haven't got it?! This

rather suggests that
you don't need to re-
cognise any private
object to give the
meaning of pain. Nor
can you say I to em-
dedicate the word pain
its necessary to re-
cognise pain when it
does come. For who
is to say whether you
to recognise it, un-
less recognising here
means feeling (attending)
recognition just really
usually rightly. In this
sense I could be said
to recognise pain when I have
Jones.

'But you can't deny

~~that~~ describe the phenomenon of people feeling pain by describing their behaviour. You do know that there's more to it than that. In your own case you know that all that happens is that under certain external circumstances you do & say such & such things. In your own case you know what that means by feeling pain is entirely independent of external circumstances, & as to internal ones the only one that matters is feeling pain.

How would I justify my pain-behaviour in order to show to some-one that I wasn't just acting in this way? I would add more expressive behaviour

But then I in my own case distinguish between, say, pretending that I have pain & really having pain, & surely I must make this distinction on some grounds! Oddly enough – no! – I do distinguish but not on any grounds.

But if you say

This aren't you saying that all the phenomenon of human pain is a phenomenon of behaviour?

If we assume a justification behind the expression of feeling & if we then try to describe this justification it turns out, that it isn't a justification after all, that we have to say things about it which take away its character of justification.

It is as though I said: this man is

N'o

~~[illegible]~~ Saardia

Then said they about the way he fumbtrous which are incompatible with his being a Saardia to N.

'This feeling of mine, however you call it justifies my behaviour'. — That already presupposes that for the use the word 'feeling'.

Common idea: a word has meaning by referring to something.

There is a connection between a w. + a obj.

What sort of connection?

Is it something like this:
The w. reminds me of the
obj.? What happens when
a thing reminds me
of something? I say
it reminds me of his
Father. Let's say
roughly seeing
produces the thought
about his father. (Remark) The
word produces an image
of a picture before my
minds eye. Is it
does you recognise him
from the picture
before your minds eye?
Would you say I see
a man with white hair etc

I suppose I'm imagining it but perhaps only someone who looks very much like him. There is however a use of pictures which resemble much more that which we make of the product of our imagination: e.g. we describe the position of objects — at street accidents + side while drawing this (line) street this (square) is the overturned car this (cross) the policeman at the corner etc. Here too we are using sentences of the same form as those which would describe

that we believe represents
a picture whereas there
we do not give a picture
an interpretation. —
It is useful here
to imagine that a
man impresses by means
of drawing or painting
sketching or even by
producing a cartoon
film. If I should
want in order to
draw he must already
have a mental picture
which he copies, the
answer is that the
mode of projection used
to copy that mental
picture is not determined
by the Cartesian therefore
neck & neither be anything
so that in fact

all that gives us a right to talk about a mental picture is the fact that we are inclined to call a (non-mental) picture a representation of a mental one.

'Is there then no such thing as a mental picture?' The proper answer to a question thus worded would be 'is'! 'People at times have mental pictures'. But this ~~doesn't~~ isn't really the answer we wanted. We meant to ask: have we a right, under the circumstances under

which it is normally said that a man has a mental image, to say that he has such an image or picture? Have we a right to say that someone ~~[illegible]~~ married money? This may mean did he 'marry money' or is the expression an appropriate one. Think of the way in which such a question is decided? - Suppose we ask the question: are people murdered in tragedies or aren't they? One answer is: In some tragedies some people are murdered ~~not in others~~. Another answer: 'people aren't really murdered

on the stage. They only pretend to murder & to die. But the use of the word pretend here is again ambiguous ~~for~~ it may be used ~~in~~ the sense in which Edgar pretends to have led Glouester to the cliff.
// But you may say: oh no! ~~Young~~ people really die in Tragedies e.g. Juliet at the end of the play whereas therefore she pretended to have died. // Oh no they don't all pretend; the Edgar pretends to lead Glouester to the edge of the cliff

he is <u>really</u> Gl.'s son. // 26.
Glamcester is <u>really</u>
blind. // We shall
say the word 'really'
'pretend', 'die' etc are
used in a peculiar
way when we talk of
a play & differently
in ordinary life. Or:
the criteria for a
man dying in a play
aren't the same
as those of his dying
in reality. But are
we justified to say
that Lear dies at the
end of the play? (They
not. And, analogously,
that there's no reason
for objecting to saying
we have mental

picture does not mean
that we ~~that the~~
~~[illegible]~~ criteria ~~that~~
for the existence of
a non-mental picture
are the same as those
for the existence of
a mental picture.
One may even say
that the former &
the latter criteria
need not even be similar
as one may say
that the criteria
for the death of a
person in the play
& outside a play
are utterly dissimilar
though there is of
course a connection.

Back to the function of words! We could imagine a use of language in which the words we were used to bring ~~pictures~~ images before our minds an image for each word, or ~~As~~ some thought concerning the object mentioned. As when we ~~read~~ read a list of names of people whom we knew + read imagine them or ~~Rand~~ random thoughts about them. And to amplify this idea I can assume that the person who reads the list

actually sketches
the people or write
down sentences about
them. This is thoroughly
not the way the
words — a sentence
normally
work. For again we
might imagine a
particular use
of sentences in
which their purpose
is to make the rea-
der draw a certain
picture. One is tempted
to think that un-
derstanding a senten-
ce must consist in
something at least
similar to having
a picture of the

(that the sentence refers to) before ones mind. What is true in this is that there is a connection between the capability to produce such a picture + understanding. But the idea that understanding means producing such a picture or something similar is quite wrong. ~~We are tempted to~~ When we philosophise we are constantly bound to give an account

our

of ~~the~~ technique of the usage of words, and this because we are in the sense that we ~~[illegible]~~ master it & we don't know it in the sense that we have the greatest difficulty in surveying it & describing it. Thus we are inclined to look for an authority when we are to give an account of the meaning of a verb or of some activity is closely connected with it & we tend to think that

the verb stand for this activity. The use of the word understanding however is such that it ~~would be~~ very misleading to say it refers to an activity. The LSB of activities are signs that we have understood. The technique of use of the verb 'understanding' is ~~very~~ most similar to the technique of use of the verb 'to be able to'. In particular in such cases as 'to be able to play

chess'. Aren't
trying to make the
distinction between
understanding as a
disposition & u. as a
action? Ed.

A philos. problem can be
solved only in the
right surroundings.
We must surround
the case by examples
which force us to
compare it to we
must give the
problem a new sur-
rounding we must
compare it to com-
~~to this~~ we are
not used to com-

pare it with. — —

If we describe the Carp. game of fetching coloured things it ~~would~~ seems that we only describe it superficially, because the real game is plaged with impressions, & these we haven't mentioned at all in our description. It seems as if we hadn't really gone to the bottom of it.

We always forget that (impressions) is a peculiar gram. matical form, &

that we could describe phenomena without using just this form.

Talking about sense-data already means to look at phenomena in one particular way, i.e., to <u>think</u> about them in one particular fashion.

(What does green look like to me? – It looks like this to me.' –

"This is the colour

impression which I'm calling "green"?
~~Am~~ I sure I'm talking about my private impression? And how can I be sure? Do I feel that I'm talking about the impression that happens? I look at a green patch, I concentrate my attention on such a patch & I say these words. But on what grounds? Not on a green hue. On one which seems to deserve the name green?

It's not true that I see things as they are before me that they are the primary object

In Bergson in which I can explain "what green looks like to me" I could say what green looks like to other.

Swapping experiences.

Having a particular use of the word in mind.

The difference between

'Now I know the formula' & 'Now I can go on'

the difference between saying the formula & saying 'Now I know the formula'

The importance of the if-feeling.

The 'conditional feeling' not unlike seeing a vowel coloured.

Элегия

Безумных лет угасшее веселье
мне тяжело, как смутное похмелье.
Но как вино — печаль минувших дней
в моей душе чем старе, тем сильней.
Мой путь уныл. Сулит мне труд
и горе
грядущего волнуемое море.

Но не хочу, подруги, умирать!
Я жить хочу, чтоб мыслить и
страдать.
И ведаю, мне будут наслажденья
меж горестей, забот и треволненья
Порой опять гармонией упьюсь,
над вымыслом слезами обольюсь,
и, может быть, на мой закат
печальный
блеснет любовь улыбкою
прощальной.

и на немыя стогны града
полупрозрачная наляжет ночи тень
и сон, дневных трудов награда,
в то время для меня влачатся
в тишине
часы томительнаго бденья:
В бездействий ночном живей горят
во мне
змеи сердечной угрызенья:
Мечты кипят, в уме, подавленном
тоской
теснится тяжких дум избыток,
воспоминание безмолвно предо
мной
свой длинный развивает свиток.
И с отвращением читая жизнь
мою
я трепещу и проклинаю,
и горько жалуюсь, и горько слёзы лью,
но строк печальных не смываю.

Безконечны, безобразны,
В мутной месяца игре
закружились бесы разны,
будто листья в ноябре.
Сколько их! Куда их гонят?
Что так жалобно поют?
Домового ли хоронят,
ведьму ль замуж выдают?
Мчатся тучи, вьются тучи;
невидимкою луна
освещает снег летучий;
мутно небо, ночь мутна.
Мчатся бесы рой за роем
в безпредельной вышине,
визгом жалобным и воем
надрывая сердце мне...

Воспоминание

Когда для смертнаго умолкнет
шумный день

он мчал передо мной;
там сверкнул он искрой
малой
и пропал во тьме пустой".

Мчатся тучи, вьются тучи;
невидимкою луна
освещает снег летучий;
мутно небо, ночь мутна.
Сил нам нет кружиться доле;
колокольчик вдруг умолк;
кони стали. — Что там в поле?—
— "Кто их знает: пень иль волк."

Вьюга злится, вьюга плачет;
Кони чуткие храпят;
вон уж он далече скачет,
лишь глаза во мгле горят.
Кони снова понеслися;
колокольчик дин-дин-дин.—
Вижу: духи собралися
средь беленьких равнин.

освещает снег мещущий, —
мутно небо, ночь мутна.
Еду, еду в чистом поле;
колокольчик дин-дин-дин —
страшно, страшно поневоле
средь неведомых равнин.
— Эй, пошёл, ямщик! — "Нет мочи:
коням, барин, тяжело;
вьюга мне слепит очи,
все дороги занесло;
хоть убей, следа не видно,
сбились мы. Что делать нам?
В поле бес нас водит, видно,
да кружит по сторонам.
Посмотри: вон, вон играет,
дует, плюет на меня;
вон, — теперь в овраг толкает
одичалую коня;
там вёрсою невыезжой

послал к Анчару властным взглядом,
и тот послушно в путь пошёл
и к утру возвратился с ядом.
Принёс он смертную смолу
да ветвь с увядшими листами,
и пот по бледному челу
струился хладными ручьями.
Принёс, и ослабел, и лёг
под сводом шалаша на лыки,
и умер бедный раб у ног
непобедимого владыки.
А царь тем ядом напитал
свои послушливые стрелы,
и с ними гибель разослал
к соседям в чуждые пределы.

Бесы

Мчатся тучи, вьются тучи,
невидимкою луна

на почве, зноем раскаленной,
Анчар*, как грозный часовой,
стоит один во всей вселенной
Природа жаждущих* степей
его в день гнева породила,
и зелень мертвую ветвей
и корни ядом напоила.
Яд каплет сквозь его кору,
к полудню растопясь от зною,
и застывает ввечеру
густой, прозрачною смолою.
К нему и птица не летит,
и тигр пейдёт, лишь вихорь чёрный
на древо смерти навежит,
и мчится прочь, уже тлетворный.
И если туча оросит,
блуждая, лист его дремучий,
с его ветвей уж ядовит,
стекает дождь в песок горючий.
Но человека человек

и вырвал грешный мой язык,
и празднословный, и лукавый,
и жало мудрыя змеи
в уста замершия мои
вложил десницею кровавой.
И он мне грудь разсек мечом,
и сердце трепетное вынул,
и ~~угль~~ уголь, пылающий огнём,
во грудь отверстую водвинул.—
Как труп в пустыне я лежал,
и Бога глас ко мне воззвал:
"Возстань, пророк, и виждь, и внемли,
исполнись волею Моей,
и обходя моря и земли,
глаголом жги сердца людей!"

Анчар

В пустыне чахлой и скупой,

Пророк

Духовной жаждою томим,
в пустыне мрачной я влачился,
и шестикрылый серафим
на перепутье мне явился;
Перстами легкими как сон
моих зениц коснулся он:
Отверзлись вещия зеницы,
как испуганой орлицы.
Моих ушей коснулся он,
и их наполнил шум и звон:
И внял я неба содрожанье,
и горних ангелов полёт,
и гад морских подводный ход,
и дольней лозы прозябанье.
И он к устам моим тренник,

Духов
в пус
и шес
на пер
Перстал
моих
Отверз
как
моих
и их
И вы
и горн
и гад
и дольн
И он